Finance (European Stability Mechanism and Single Resolution Fund) Act 2021

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SCHEDULE 1

PART 1

Text of Amending Agreement in the Irish Language

COMHAONTÚ

LENA LEASAÃ?TEAR AN CONRADH

LENA mBUNAÃ?TEAR AN SÃ?SRA COBHSAÃ?OCHTA EORPACH

IDIR R�OCHT NA BEILGE, POBLACHT CHÓNAIDHME NA GEARM�INE,

POBLACHT NA hEASTÓINE, ÉIRE, AN PHOBLACHT HEILLÉANACH,

RÃ?OCHT NA SPÃ?INNE, POBLACHT NA FRAINCE,

POBLACHT NA hIODÃ?ILE, POBLACHT NA CIPIRE, POBLACHT NA LAITVIA,

POBLACHT NA LIOTU�INE, ARD-DIÚCACHT LUCSAMBURG, POBLACHT

MHÃ?LTA, RÃ?OCHT NA hÃ?SILTÃ?RE, POBLACHT NA hOSTAIRE,

POBLACHT NA PORTAINGÉILE, POBLACHT NA SLÓIVÉINE,

POBLACHT NA SLÓVAICE AGUS POBLACHT NA FIONLAINNE

BROLLACH

TÃ? NA PÃ?IRTITHE CONARTHACHA, Ríocht na Beilge, Poblacht Chónaidhme na Gearmáine, Poblacht na hEastóine, Éire, an Phoblacht Heilléanach, Ríocht na Spáinne, Poblacht na Fraince, Poblacht na hIodáile, Poblacht na Cipire, Poblacht na Laitvia, Poblacht na Liotuáine, Ard-Diúcacht Lucsamburg, Poblacht Mhálta, Ríocht na hÃ?siltíre, Poblacht na hOstaire, Poblacht na Portaingéile, Poblacht na Slóivéine, Poblacht na Slóvaice agus Poblacht na Fionlainne (“Ballstáit an limistéir euro” nó na “Sínitheoirí”);

AG AITHINT DÓIBH an comhaontú chun cistiú a shlógadh agus maoiniú a chur ar fáil faoin gcúlstop chun críocha úsáid an Chiste Réitigh Aonair (“CRA”), atá faoi úinéireacht an Bhoird Réitigh Aonair (“BRA”) a bunaíodh i gcomhréir le Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 806/2014 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle an 15 Iúil 2014 lena mbunaítear rialacha aonfhoirmeacha agus nós imeachta aonfhoirmeach maidir le réiteach institiúidí creidmheasa agus gnólachtaí infheistíochta áirithe faoi chuimsiú Sásra Réitigh Aonair agus Ciste Réitigh Aonair agus lena leasaítear Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 1093/2010¹ ;

AG AITHINT DÓIBH phríomhról an tSásra Cobhsaíochta Eorpaigh (“SCE”) sa bhainistiú géarchéime, ról a fheidhmíonn sé trí thacaíocht chobhsaíochta a chur ar fáil go tráthúil agus go héifeachtach do Bhallstáit an limistéir euro;

TAR ÉIS DÓIBH TEACHT AR CHOMHAONTÚ maidir le pacáiste cuimsitheach chun an tAontas Eacnamaíoch agus Airgeadaíochta a neartú tuilleadh;

AGUS É MAR AIDHM ACU an Sásra Cobhsaíochta Eorpach a fhorbairt tuilleadh chun athléimneacht agus acmhainní réitigh géarchéime an limistéir euro a neartú, agus leanúint de dhlí an Aontais Eorpaigh a lánurramú lena linn sin;

AG CUIMHNEAMH DÓIBH gur dhearbhaigh Ceannairí Stáit nó Rialtais na mBallstát a bhfuil an euro mar airgeadra acu, ag Cruinniú Mullaigh Euro an 29 Meitheamh 2018 a tionóladh i bhformáid chuimsitheach, go gcuirfeadh SCE an cúlstop coiteann ar fáil do CRA agus go neartófaí é ar bhonn na n-eilimintí a leagtar amach i litir Uachtarán an Ghrúpa Euro dar dáta an 25 Meitheamh 2018;

AG CUIMHNEAMH DÓIBH FREISIN gur fhormhuinigh Ceannairí Stáit nó Rialtais na mBallstát a bhfuil an euro mar airgeadra acu, ag Cruinniú Mullaigh Euro an 14 Nollaig 2018 a tionóladh i bhformáid chuimsitheach, le téarmaí tagartha an chúlstop choitinn sin maille le bileog téarmaí maidir le hathchóiriú SCE, agus gur thug Ceannairí Stáit nó Rialtais na mBallstát a bhfuil an euro mar airgeadra acu, ag Cruinniú Mullaigh Euro an 21 Meitheamh 2019 a tionóladh i bhformáid chuimsitheach, dá n-aire an comhaontú leathan ar thángthas air maidir le leasú an Chonartha lena mBunaítear an Sásra Cobhsaíochta Eorpach,

TAR ÉIS COMHAONTÚ mar a leanas:

AIRTEAGAL 1

Leasuithe ar an gConradh lena mBunaítear an Sásra Cobhsaíochta Eorpach

Leasaítear an Conradh lena mBunaítear an Sásra Cobhsaíochta Eorpach mar a leanas:

A. Leasaítear an brollach mar a leanas:

(1) Cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad aithris (4):

“(4) Is é an chéad bheart cosanta ba cheart a bheith ann fós i gcoinne géarchéimeanna muiníne a dhéanfadh difear do chobhsaíocht an limistéir euro, urramú docht chreat dlí an Aontais Eorpaigh, urramú docht an chreata chomhtháite um fhaireachas buiséadach agus maicreacnamaíoch, go háirithe an Comhshocrú Cobhsaíochta agus Fáis, urramú docht an chreata um míchothromaíochtaí maicreacnamaíocha agus na rialacha maidir le rialachas eacnamaíoch an Aontais Eorpaigh.”.

(2) Cuirtear isteach na haithrisí seo a leanas:

“(5a) Ag Cruinniú Mullaigh Euro an 29 Meitheamh 2018 a tionóladh i bhformáid chuimsitheach, dhearbhaigh Ceannairí Stáit nó Rialtais na mBallstát a bhfuil an euro mar airgeadra acu go soláthródh SCE an cúlstop coiteann don Chiste Réitigh Aonair (‘CRA’) agus go neartófaí é ar bhonn na n-eilimintí a leagtar amach i litir Uachtarán an Ghrúpa Euro dar dáta an 25 Meitheamh 2018. Ag Cruinniú Mullaigh Euro an 14 Nollaig 2018 a tionóladh i bhformáid chuimsitheach, d’fhormhuinigh Ceannairí Stáit nó Rialtais na mBallstát a bhfuil an euro mar airgeadra acu le téarmaí tagartha an chúlstop choitinn sin atá le cur ar fáil ag SCE, maille le bileog téarmaí maidir le hathchóiriú SCE. Foráiltear, sa bhileog téarmaí maidir le hathchóiriú SCE, go mbunófar an cúlstop coiteann i gcomhair CRA faoi dheireadh na hidirthréimhse, ar a dhéanaí. Foráiltear freisin, sa bhileog téarmaí maidir le hathchóiriú an tSásra Cobhsaíochta Eorpaigh, go méadófar éifeachtacht na n-ionstraimí cúnaimh airgeadais réamhchúraim i gcomhair Comhaltaí de SCE a bhfuil bunstaid a ngeilleagair ar fónamh, a bhféadfadh turraing dhíobhálach a bheadh thar a smacht difear a dhéanamh dóibh. I gcomhréir leis an gcomhsheasamh maidir leis an gcomhar sa todhchaí idir an Coimisiún Eorpach agus SCE, atá mar iarscríbhinn a ghabhann leis an mbileog téarmaí maidir le hathchóiriú SCE maidir leis an measúnú incháilitheachta faoin líne chreidmheasa réamhchúraim, ag brath ar raon beacht na gcritéar incháilitheachta, gabhfaidh an Coimisiún Eorpach agus SCE orthu a róil féin faoi seach i gcomhréir le dlí an Aontais Eorpaigh, leis an gConradh seo agus le treoirlínte SCE. Foráiltear freisin, sa bhileog téarmaí maidir le hathchóiriú SCE, go gcuirfear corrlach breise i bhfeidhm i gcás nach ndéanfadh Comhalta de SCE, ar deonaíodh cúnamh airgeadais réamhchúraim SCE dó, an choinníollacht a ghabhann leis an gcúnamh sin a chomhlíonadh tar éis dó cistí a tharraingt, ach amháin i gcás inarb é is cúis leis an neamh-chomhlíonadh sin imthosca a bhí thar smacht an rialtais. Thairis sin, sa bhileog téarmaí maidir le hathchóiriú SCE, daingnítear go bhfuil an choinníollacht fós ina prionsabal bunúsach de chuid an Chonartha seo agus de chuid ionstraimí uile SCE, ach go gcaithfear na téarmaí beachta a chur in oiriúint do gach ionstraim ar leith.

(5b) Sa chomhsheasamh maidir leis an gcomhar sa todhchaí idir SCE agus an Coimisiún Eorpach, leagtar amach an comhaontú maidir le módúlachtaí nua an chomhair laistigh de chláir chúnaimh airgeadais agus lasmuigh díobh. Tá cuspóirí comhchoiteanna ag an gCoimisiún Eorpach agus ag SCE agus feidhmeoidh siad cúraimí sonracha a bhaineann leis an mbainistiú géarchéime ar son an limistéir euro ar bhonn dhlí an Aontais Eorpaigh agus an Chonartha seo. Dá bhrí sin, oibreoidh an dá institiúid go dlúth le chéile ar bhearta bainistithe géarchéime SCE lena ngabhfaidh rialachas éifeachtúil a shaothróidh an chobhsaíocht airgeadais trí shaineolas a chéile a chomhlánú. Ã?irithíonn an Coimisiún Eorpach an chomhsheasmhacht le dlí an Aontais Eorpaigh, go háirithe leis an gcreat um chomhordú an bheartais eacnamaíoch. Déanann SCE a chuid anailíse agus measúnaithe trí pheirspictíocht iasachtóra. Déanfar an comhsheasamh maidir leis an gcomhar sa todhchaí a ionchorprú go hiomlán i meabhrán comhair, mar a leagtar amach in Airteagal 13(8), nuair a thiocfaidh na leasuithe ar an gConradh seo i bhfeidhm.”.

(3) In aithris (7), cuirtear an abairt seo a leanas léi:

“Tugann Comhaltaí SCE aitheantas don idirphlé atá ar siúl idir an Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta agus Parlaimint na hEorpa.”.

(4) In aithris (8), cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad an tríú habairt:

“Maidir le haon Bhallstát den limistéar euro a iarrfaidh cúnamh airgeadais ar SCE, beifear ag súil go ndéanfaidh sé, i ngach cás inarb iomchuí, iarraidh chomhchosúil a dhíriú chuig CAI.”.

(5) Cuirtear isteach an aithris seo a leanas:

“(9a) Ballstáit den Aontas Eorpach nach bhfuil an euro mar airgeadra acu agus a bhfuil dlúthchomhar bunaithe acu leis an mBanc Ceannais Eorpach (‘BCE’) i gcomhréir le Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 1024/2013 ón gComhairle an 15 Deireadh Fómhair 2013 lena dtugtar cúraimí sonracha don Bhanc Ceannais Eorpach maidir le beartais a bhaineann le maoirseacht stuamachta ar institiúidí creidmheasa² , beifear ag súil go gcuirfidh siad línte creidmheasa comhthreomhara ar fáil, i gcomhar le SCE, i gcomhair CRA. Beidh na Ballstáit sin rannpháirteach, ar théarmaí coibhéiseacha, sa chúlstop coiteann (‘Ballstáit Rannpháirteacha’). Ba cheart a iarraidh ar ionadaithe na mBallstát Rannpháirteach freastal, i gcáil breathnóirí, ar chruinnithe den Bhord Rialtóirí agus den Bhord Stiúrthóirí ina bpléifear ábhair a bhaineann leis an gcúlstop coiteann agus ba cheart an rochtain ar fhaisnéis a bheidh acu sin agus ag ionadaithe eile a bheith comhionann. Ba cheart socruithe iomchuí a chur ar bun i gcomhair comhroinnt faisnéise agus comhordú tráthúil idir SCE agus na Ballstáit Rannpháirteacha. Ba cheart é a bheith indéanta a iarraidh ar ionadaithe de chuid an Bhoird Réitigh Aonair (‘BRA’) freastal, i gcáil breathnóirí, ar bhonn ad hoc, ar chruinnithe den Bhord Rialtóirí agus den Bhord Stiúrthóirí ina bpléifear an maoiniú faoin gcúlstop.”.

(6) Cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad aithris (10):

“(10) An 20 Meitheamh 2011, thug ionadaithe Rialtais Bhallstáit an Aontais Eorpaigh údarú do na Páirtithe Conarthacha sa Chonradh seo a iarraidh ar an gCoimisiún Eorpach agus ar BCE na cúraimí dá bhforáiltear sa Chonradh seo a chomhlíonadh. Admhaítear nach bhfuil san áireamh, sna dualgais a thugtar don Choimisiún Eorpach agus do BCE leis an gConradh seo, aon chumhachtaí chun cinntí dá gcuid féin a dhéanamh agus gur ar SCE agus air sin amháin a chuirfear ceangal leis na cúraimí a fhorghníomhú an dá institiúid sin ar bhonn an Chonartha seo.”.

(7) In aithris (11), cuirtear na habairtí seo a leanas léi:

“Tar éis thabhairt isteach na CCGanna sin amhail ón 1 Eanáir 2013, tá Comhaltaí SCE tiomanta do CCGanna a thabhairt isteach lena ndéanfar foráil le haghaidh vótáil chomhiomlán uile-shraitheach (‘CCGanna uile-shraitheachta’) faoi 2022. Déanfar na módúlachtaí dlí mionsonraithe a chomhaontú laistigh den Choiste Eacnamaíoch agus Airgeadais, agus lena linn sin tabharfar ceanglais bhunreachtúla náisiúnta san áireamh, chun go gcuirfidh Comhaltaí uile SCE na CCGanna uile-shraitheachta chun feidhme i leith urrúis rialtais nua sa limistéar euro ar dhóigh a áiritheoidh gur comhionann a bheidh toradh dlí na CCGanna sin.”.

(8) Cuirtear isteach na haithrisí seo a leanas:

“(11a) Arna iarraidh sin do Chomhalta de SCE agus i gcás inarb iomchuí, féadfaidh SCE idirphlé a éascú idir an Comhalta sin de SCE agus a infheisteoirí príobháideacha ar bhonn deonach neamhfhoirmiúil neamhcheangailteach sealadach rúnda.

(11b) Is do Chomhaltaí de SCE a meastar go bhfuil a bhfiachas inbhuanaithe agus a ndeimhnítear gurb acmhainn dóibh an aisíocaíocht le SCE, agus dóibhsean amháin, ba cheart do SCE tacaíocht chobhsaíochta a dheonú. Is ar bhonn trédhearcach sothuartha a dhéanfar measúnú ar inbhuanaitheacht fiachais agus ar acmhainn aisíocaíochta, cé gurb amhlaidh, lena linn sin, go mbeidh fairsinge go leor ann le haghaidh an dea-bhreithiúnais. Is iad a dhéanfaidh na measúnaithe sin an Coimisiún Eorpach i gcuibhreann le BCE, agus SCE agus i ngach cás inarb iomchuí agus indéanta in éineacht le CAI i gcomhréir leis an gConradh seo, le dlí an Aontais Eorpaigh agus leis an meabhrán comhair arna dhéanamh de bhun Airteagal 13(8). I gcás nach n-eascraíonn dearcadh comhchoiteann as an gcomhoibriú, déanfaidh an Coimisiún Eorpach measúnú foriomlán ar inbhuanaitheacht an fhiachais phoiblí, agus déanfaidh SCE measúnú ar acmhainn an Chomhalta de SCE lena mbaineann aisíocaíocht a dhéanamh le SCE.”.

(9) Cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad aithris (12):

“(12) I gcásanna eisceachtúla, déanfar foirm rannpháirtíochta ag an earnáil phríobháideach, ar foirm iomchuí chomhréireach í atá i gcomhréir le cleachtas CAI, a bhreithniú i gcásanna ina ndeonaítear tacaíocht chobhsaíochta agus coinníollacht ag gabháil léi i bhfoirm clár coigeartuithe maicreacnamaíocha.”.

(10) In aithris (13), cuirtear an abairt seo a leanas léi:

“Beidh stádas mar chreidiúnaí tosaíochta ag iasachtaí cúlstop a thabharfaidh SCE do BRA, ar bhealach atá comhchosúil leis an mbealach ina bhfuil an stádas sin ag iasachtaí eile a thugann SCE.”.

(11) Cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad aithris 14:

“(14) Tacóidh Ballstáit an limistéir euro le deonú stádais choibhéisigh mar chreidiúnaí do SCE agus do Stáit eile a thabharfaidh iasachtaí déthaobhacha i gcomhar le SCE, agus áireofar air sin é sin a dhéanamh i ndáil le hiasachtaí cúlstop do BRA.”.

(12) Cuirtear isteach na haithrisí seo a leanas:

“(15a) Leagtar amach le hAirteagal 2(3) den Chonradh ar Fheidhmiú an Aontais Eorpaigh (‘CFAE’) go ndéanfaidh Ballstáit an Aontais Eorpaigh comhordú ar a mbeartais eacnamaíocha laistigh de shocruithe dá bhforáiltear in CFAE. I gcomhréir le hAirteagal 5(1) CFAE agus le hAirteagal 121 CFAE, tá Ballstáit an Aontais Eorpaigh chun comhordú a dhéanamh, laistigh de Chomhairle an Aontais Eorpaigh, ar a gcuid beartas eacnamaíoch. Dá réir sin, níor cheart feidhm a bheith ag SCE chun críoch comhordaithe beartas eacnamaíoch i measc Comhaltaí de SCE, óir déantar foráil le dlí an Aontais Eorpaigh maidir leis na socruithe is gá chuige sin. Urramaíonn SCE na cumhachtaí a thugtar, le dlí an Aontais Eorpaigh, d’institiúidí agus do chomhlachtaí an Aontais.

(15b) Aithníonn Comhaltaí SCE go bhfuil cinnteoireacht thapa, éifeachtúil faoi shaoráid an chúlstop agus comhordú leis na Ballstáit Rannpháirteacha a ghlacfaidh páirt, i gcomhar le SCE, i maoiniú faoin gcúlstop i gcomhair CRA thar a bheith tábhachtach chun éifeachtacht an chúlstop choitinn agus na réiteach a mhaoinítear leis a áirithiú, de réir mar a léirítear i dtéarmaí tagartha an chúlstop choitinn a d’fhormhuinigh Ceannairí Stáit agus Rialtais na mBallstát a bhfuil an euro mar airgeadra acu leis ag Cruinniú Mullaigh Euro an 14 Nollaig 2018 a tionóladh i bhformáid chuimsitheach. Foráiltear, sna téarmaí tagartha, go n‑áireoidh critéir i leith eisíocaíochtaí faoin tsaoráid chúlstop inter alia prionsabal na rogha deiridh agus prionsabal na neodrachta buiséadaí ar feadh an mheántéarma, lán-chomhlíonadh Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 806/2014 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle an 15 Iúil 2014 lena mbunaítear rialacha aonfhoirmeacha agus nós imeachta aonfhoirmeach maidir le réiteach institiúidí creidmheasa agus gnólachtaí infheistíochta áirithe faoi chuimsiú Sásra Réitigh Aonair agus Ciste Réitigh Aonair agus lena leasaítear Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 1093/2010³ (‘SRMR’) agus Threoir 2014/59/AE ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle an 15 Bealtaine 2014 lena mbunaítear creat do théarnamh agus do réiteach institiúidí creidmheasa agus gnólachtaí infheistíochta agus lena leasaítear Treoir 82/891/CEE ón gComhairle, agus Treoracha 2001/24/CE, 2002/47/CE, 2004/25/CE, 2005/56/CE, 2007/36/CE, 2011/35/AE, 2012/30/AE agus 2013/36/AE, agus Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 1093/2010, agus Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 648/2012⁴ (‘TTRB’), agus bhuaine an chreata dlí. Foráiltear, sna téarmaí tagartha, go ndéanfaidh SCE cinneadh maidir le húsáid an chúlstop, de ghnáth, laistigh de 12 uair an chloig ón tráth a bhfaighidh BRA an iarraidh, agus beidh an tréimhse sin infhadaithe ag an Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta go dtí 24 uair an chloig i gcásanna eisceachtúla, go háirithe i gcás oibríocht réitigh thar a bheith casta, agus ceanglais bhunreachtúla náisiúnta á n-urramú lena linn sin.”.

(13) Cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad aithris 16:

“(16) Aithnítear leis an gConradh seo neamhspleáchas Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta agus fhoireann SCE. Ba cheart é a fheidhmiú ar dhóigh, i gcás inarb ábhartha agus mar a fhoráiltear sa Chonradh seo, a gcaomhnóidh an chomhréireacht le dlí an Aontais Eorpaigh, arb é an Coimisiún Eorpach a dhéanann maoirseacht ar a chur i bhfeidhm.”.

(14) Cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad aithris 17:

“(17) Ba cheart díospóidí a eascróidh idir na Páirtithe Conarthacha nó idir na Páirtithe Conarthacha agus SCE maidir le léiriú agus cur i bhfeidhm an Chonartha seo a chur faoi bhráid dhlínse Chúirt Bhreithiúnais an Aontais Eorpaigh, i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 273 CFAE.

(18) Cuirfidh SCE córais foláirimh chuí ar bun agus é mar aidhm leo a áirithiú go bhfaighidh sé, ar dhóigh thráthúil, aon aisíocaíochtaí a bheidh ag dul dó i ndáil le tacaíocht chobhsaíochta nó i ndáil leis an tsaoráid chúlstop. Déanfaidh an Coimisiún Eorpach, i gcuibhreann le BCE, agus Comhairle an Aontais Eorpaigh faireachas iarchláir faoi chuimsiú an chreata a leagtar síos de bhun Airteagail 121 agus 136 CFAE,”.

B. Leasaítear na hAirteagail mar a leanas:

(15) Cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad Airteagal 3:

“AIRTEAGAL 3

Cuspóirí

1. Is é is cuspóir do SCE cistiú a shlógadh agus tacaíocht chobhsaíochta a sholáthar, faoi choinníollacht dhocht, a bheidh cuí don ionstraim cúnaimh airgeadais a roghnófar, chun leasa Comhaltaí de SCE a bhfuil deacrachtaí móra maoinithe acu nó a bhfuil deacrachtaí móra maoinithe ag bagairt orthu, má tá na nithe sin fíor-riachtanach chun cobhsaíocht airgeadais an limistéir euro ina iomláine agus a Bhallstát a choimirciú. I gcás inarb ábhartha chun é féin a ullmhú go hinmheánach agus é a bheith ar a chumas, ar dhóigh chuí thráthúil, tabhairt faoi na cúramaí a thugtar dó leis an gconradh seo, féadfaidh SCE súil a choinneáil ar staid mhaicreacnamaíoch agus airgeadais a Chomhaltaí, agus measúnú a dhéanamh orthu, lena n-áirítear inbhuanaitheacht a bhfiachais phoiblí, agus féadfaidh sé anailís a dhéanamh ar fhaisnéis agus ar shonraí ábhartha. Chun na críche sin, oibreoidh an Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta i gcomhar leis an gCoimisiún Eorpach agus le BCE chun a áirithiú go mbeidh lán-chomhsheasmhacht ann leis an gcreat um chomhordú an bheartais eacnamaíoch dá bhforáiltear in CFAE.

2. Féadfaidh SCE an tsaoráid chúlstop a sholáthair do BRA i gcomhair CRA chun tacú le cur i bhfeidhm na n-uirlisí réitigh agus le feidhmiú chumhachtaí réitigh BRA mar a chumhdaítear i ndlí an Aontais Eorpaigh.

3. Chun na gcríoch sin, beidh SCE i dteideal cistí a thiomsú trí ionstraimí airgeadais a eisiúint nó trí theacht ar chomhaontuithe nó ar shocruithe airgeadais, nó ar chomhaontuithe nó ar shocruithe eile, le Comhaltaí de SCE, le hinstitiúidí airgeadais nó le tríú páirtithe eile.

4. Gan dochar do mhír 1, an choinníollacht a chuirfear i bhfeidhm, beidh sí iomchuí don ionstraim cúnaimh airgeadais a roghnófar, mar a leagtar síos sa Chonradh seo.”.

(16) In Airteagal 4(4), cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad na chéad abairte:

“De mhaolú ar mhír 3 den Airteagal seo, déanfar nós imeachta vótála éigeandála a úsáid i gcásanna ina dtagann an Coimisiún Eorpach agus BCE araon ar an tátal go mbeadh bagairt ann ar inbhuanaitheacht eacnamaíoch agus airgeadais an limistéir euro má mhainnítear cinneadh a ghlacadh go práinneach chun cúnamh airgeadais, arna shainmhíniú in Airteagail 13 go 18, a dheonú nó a chur chun feidhme.”.

(17) Leasaítear Airteagal 5 mar a leanas:

(a) i mír 4, cuirtear an abairt seo a leanas léi:

“Maidir le hionadaithe Ballstát Rannpháirteach a ghlacfaidh páirt i gcomhar le SCE i maoiniú faoin gcúlstop i gcomhair CRA, iarrfar orthu sin freisin freastal, i gcáil breathnóirí, ar chruinnithe an Bhoird Rialtóirí nuair a phléifear ábhair a bhaineann leis an gcúlstop coiteann.”;

(b) leasaítear mír 6 mar a leanas:

(i) cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad phointe (a):

“(a) an cúlchiste éigeandála a chealú agus a bhfuil ann a aistriú ar ais chuig an gcúlchiste agus/nó chuig an gcaipiteal íoctha, i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 4(4), an fhionraí ar chur i bhfeidhm na chéad fhomhíre d’Airteagal 18a(6) a chealú, an tromlach vótála, faoin nós imeachta éigeandála vótála, a theastaíonn chun cinneadh a ghlacadh maidir le hiasachtaí, agus na heisíocaíochtaí ina leith, faoin tsaoráid chúlstop a athrú agus na himthosca ina ndéanfar athbhreithniú amach anseo a shocrú, i gcomhréir leis an tríú fomhír d’Airteagal 18a(6) ;”;

(ii) cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad phointe (f):

“(f) tacaíocht chobhsaíochta ó SCE a sholáthar, lena n-áirítear an choinníollacht i dtaca le beartas eacnamaíoch arna lua sa mheabhrán tuisceana dá dtagraítear in Airteagal 13(3) nó dá dtagraítear in Airteagal 14(2), agus an rogha ionstraimí agus na téarmaí agus na coinníollacha airgeadais a bhunú, i gcomhréir le hAirteagail 12 go 18;”;

(iii) cuirtear isteach an pointe seo a leanas:

“(fa) na critéir incháilitheachta a athrú le haghaidh an chúnaimh airgeadais réamhchúraim a leagtar amach in Iarscríbhinn III i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 14(1) ;”;

(iv) cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad phointe (g):

“(g) a chur de chúram (i) ar an Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta agus (ii) ar an gCoimisiún Eorpach i gcuibhreann le BCE, an choinníollacht i dtaca le beartas eacnamaíoch a bheidh ag gabháil le cúnamh airgeadais i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 13(3), a chaibidliú, le chéile;”;

(v) cuirtear isteach an pointe seo a leanas:

“(ga) saoráid chúlstop a dheonú, i gcomhréir leis an gcéad fhomhír d’Airteagal 18a(1), na critéir i dtaca le formheas iasachtaí agus eisíocaíochtaí faoin tsaoráid chúlstop a leagtar amach in Iarscríbhinn IV i gcomhréir leis an dara fomhír d’Airteagal 18a(1) a athrú, aon cheann de heilimintí a leagtar amach sa tríú fomhír d’Airteagal 18a(1) a chinneadh, agus cinneadh a dhéanamh maidir le foirceannadh a dhéanamh ar an tsaoráid chúlstop sin, nó leanúint ar aghaidh léi, i gcomhréir le hAirteagail 18a(1) agus (8) ;”;

(vi) cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad phointe (h):

“(h) an beartas praghsála agus an treoirlíne praghsála le haghaidh cúnamh airgeadais nó saoráid chúlstop i gcomhair CRA a athrú, i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 20;”;

(vii) cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad phointe (j):

“(j) na módúlachtaí a bhunú maidir le haistriú na tacaíochta ó SaorCAE go dtí SCE, lena n-áirítear tráinse breise caipitil údaraithe a chruthú, i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 40;”.

(18) Leasaítear Airteagal 6 mar a leanas:

(a) i mír 3, cuirtear an abairt seo a leanas léi:

“Maidir le hionadaithe Ballstát Rannpháirteach a ghlacfaidh páirt i gcomhar le SCE i maoiniú faoin gcúlstop i gcomhair CRA, iarrfar orthu sin freisin freastal, i gcáil breathnóirí, ar chruinnithe an Bhoird Stiúrthóirí nuair a phléifear saincheisteanna a bhaineann leis an gcúlstop.”;

(b) cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad mhír 4:

“(4) Féadfaidh an Bord Stiúrthóirí a iarraidh ar dhaoine eile, lena n-áirítear ionadaithe de chuid institiúidí nó eagraíochtaí, freastal, i gcáil breathnóirí, ar chruinnithe ar bhonn ad hoc.”.

(19) In Airteagal 7(4), cuirtear an abairt seo a leanas leis:

“Ní bheidh Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta ná foireann SCE freagrach ach do SCE amháin agus beidh siad neamhspleách ar fad i gcomhlíonadh a ndualgas.”.

(20) Leasaítear Airteagal 12 mar a leanas:

(a) cuirtear isteach an mhír seo a leanas:

“1a. Féadfaidh SCE an tsaoráid chúlstop a sholáthar do CRA, gan dochar do dhlí an Aontais Eorpaigh ná d’inniúlachtaí institiúidí agus chomhlachtaí an Aontais Eorpaigh. Ní dheonófar iasachtaí faoin tsaoráid chúlstop ach amháin mar rogha dheiridh agus ní dheonófar iad ach a mhéid a bheidh neodracht bhuiséadach ar feadh an mheántéarma ag baint leis sin.”;

(b) i mír 3, cuirtear an abairt seo a leanas léi:

“Beidh feidhm ag vótáil chomhiomlán uile-shraitheach i leith na n-urrús rialtais nua uile sa limistéar euro, lena ngabhfaidh aibíocht níos faide ná bliain amháin, a eiseofar an 1 Eanáir 2022 nó dá éis sin.”;

(c) cuirtear an mhír seo a leanas leis:

“4. Le linn dó na cúraimí a thugtar dó sa Chonradh seo a fheidhmiú, áiritheoidh an Coimisiún Eorpach, maidir le haon oibríochtaí cúnaimh airgeadais a sholáthróidh SCE faoin gConradh seo, go mbeidh na hoibríochtaí sin, i gcás inarb ábhartha, i gcomhréir le dlí an Aontais Eorpaigh, go háirithe leis na bearta comhordaithe beartais eacnamaíoch dá bhforáiltear in CFAE.”.

(21) Leasaítear Airteagal 13 mar a leanas:

(a) leasaítear mír 1 mar a leanas:

(i) cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad na foclaíochta réamhráití:

“1. Féadfaidh Comhalta de SCE iarraidh ar thacaíocht chobhsaíochta a dhíriú chuig Cathaoirleach an Bhoird Rialtóirí. Léireofar san iarraidh sin an ionstraim nó na hionstraimí cúnaimh airgeadais a bheidh le breithniú. Ar iarraidh den sórt sin a fháil, cuirfidh Cathaoirleach an Bhoird Rialtóirí de, (i) ar an Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta agus (ii) ar an gCoimisiún Eorpach i gcuibhreann le BCE, na cúraimí seo a leanas a chur i gcrích in éineacht le chéile:”;

(ii) cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad phointe (b);

“(b) measúnú a dhéanamh i dtaobh an bhfuil an fiachas poiblí inbhuanaithe agus i dtaobh an féidir an tacaíocht chobhsaíochta a aisíoc. Déanfar an measúnú sin ar dhóigh thrédhearcach shothuartha, cé gurb amhlaidh, lena linn sin, go mbeidh fairsinge go leor ann le haghaidh an dea-bhreithiúnais. Aon uair is iomchuí agus is féidir, ní foláir measúnú den sórt sin a dhéanamh in éineacht le CAI;”;

(b) cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad mhír 2:

“2. Ar bhonn iarraidh an Chomhalta de SCE agus na measúnuithe dá dtagraítear i mír 1 den Airteagal seo, agus mholadh an Stiúrthóra Bainistíochta a bheidh bunaithe ar na measúnuithe sin agus, i gcás inarb infheidhme, na measúnuithe dearfacha dá dtagraítear in Airteagal 14(1) agus (2), féadfaidh an Bord Rialtóirí cinneadh a dhéanamh tacaíocht chobhsaíochta a dheonú, i bprionsabal, don Chomhalta de SCE lena mbaineann, i bhfoirm saoráid cúnaimh airgeadais.”;

(c) i mír 3, cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad na chéad fhomhíre:

“3. Má ghlactar cinneadh de bhun mhír 2 cé is moite de chinneadh i leith líne chreidmheasa faoi choinníoll réamhchúraim, cuirfidh an Bord Rialtóirí de chúram (i) ar an Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta agus (ii) ar an gCoimisiún Eorpach i gcuibhreann le BCE, in éineacht le chéile agus, i ngach cás inar féidir, in éineacht le CAI, freisin an cúram dul i mbun caibidlíochta leis an gComhalta de SCE lena mbaineann maidir le meabhrán tuisceana (‘MT’) ina ndéanfar mionsonrú ar an gcoinníollacht a bheidh ag gabháil leis an tsaoráid cúnaimh airgeadais. Beidh inneachar an MT ag freagairt do dhéine na laigí a bhfuil aghaidh le tabhairt orthu agus don ionstraim cúnaimh airgeadais atá roghnaithe. Ullmhóidh an Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta togra le haghaidh comhaontú um shaoráid cúnaimh airgeadais, lena n-áireofar na téarmaí agus na coinníollacha airgeadais, agus an rogha ionstraimí, a bheidh le glacadh ag an mBord Rialtóirí.”;

(d) cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad mhír 4:

“4. Síneoidh an Coimisiún Eorpach agus an Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta an MT thar ceann SCE, ach sin faoi réir na coinníollacha a leagtar amach i mír 3 a chomhlíonadh roimh ré agus faoi réir a fhormheasa ag an mBord Rialtóirí.”;

(e) cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad mhír 7:

“7. Beidh sé de chúram (i) ar an Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta agus (ii) ar an gCoimisiún Eorpach i gcuibhreann le BCE, in éineacht le chéile agus, i ngach cás inar féidir, in éineacht le CAI freisin, faireachán a dhéanamh ar chomhlíonadh na coinníollachta a bheidh ag gabháil leis an tsaoráid cúnaimh airgeadais.”;

(f) cuirtear an mhír seo a leanas leis:

“8. Faoi réir formheas an Bhoird Stiúrthóirí a bheith faighte aige roimh ré de thoil a chéile, féadfaidh SCE dul faoi chuing meabhrán comhair a dhéanamh leis an gCoimisiún Eorpach, meabhrán tuisceana lena ndéanfar mionsonrú ar an gcomhar idir an Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta agus an Coimisiún Eorpach i ndáil le comhlíonadh na gcúraimí a leagtar orthu de bhun mhíreanna 1, 3 agus 7 den Airteagal seo, agus dá dtagraítear in Airteagal 3(1).”.

(22) Cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad Airteagal 14:

“AIRTEAGAL 1

Cúnamh airgeadais réamhchúraim SCE

1. Trí ionstraimí cúnaimh airgeadais réamhchúraim SCE, déantar tacaíocht airgeadais a sholáthar do Chomhaltaí de SCE a bhfuil bunstaid a ngeilleagair ar fónamh agus a bhféadfaí difear a dhéanamh dóibh de dheasca turraing dhíobhálach a bheadh thar a smacht. Féadfaidh an Bord Rialtóirí a chinneadh cúnamh airgeadais réamhchúraim a dheonú do Chomhalta de SCE, a bhfuil a fhiachas rialtais inbhuanaithe, i bhfoirm líne chreidmheasa faoi choinníoll réamhchúraim nó i bhfoirm líne chreidmheasa faoi choinníollacha breisithe i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 12(1), ach sin faoi réir critéir incháilitheachta a chomhlíonadh ar critéir iad a chuirfear i bhfeidhm maidir le gach cineál cúnaimh den sórt sin mar a fhoráiltear in Iarscríbhinn III.

Féadfaidh an Bord Rialtóirí cinneadh a dhéanamh na critéir incháilitheachta le haghaidh an chúnaimh airgeadais réamhchúraim SCE a athrú agus Iarscríbhinn III a leasú dá réir sin. Tiocfaidh an leasú sin i bhfeidhm tar éis do Chomhaltaí SCE fógra a thabhairt don Taiscí á rá go bhfuil a nósanna imeachta náisiúnta is infheidhme tugtha i gcrích.

2. Cuimseoidh an choinníollacht a ghabhfaidh le líne chreidmheasa faoi choinníoll réamhchúraim, urramú leanúnach na gcritéar incháilitheachta dá bhforáiltear in Iarscríbhinn III agus tabharfaidh an Comhalta de SCE lena mbaineann gealltanas tiomantais ina leith ina iarraidh shínithe de bhun Airteagal 13(1) ar iarraidh í ina dtarraingeoidh sé aird ar an intinn atá aige faoina phríomhbheartais (‘Litir Intinne’).Tar éis dó Litir Intinne den sórt sin a fháil, cuirfidh Cathaoirleach an Bhoird Rialtóirí de chúram ar an gCoimisiún Eorpach measúnú a dhéanamh i dtaobh an bhfuil an intinn bheartais a léirítear sa Litir Intinne i lánchomhréir leis na bearta comhordaithe beartais eacnamaíoch dá bhforáiltear in CFAE, go háirithe an bhfuil siad i lánchomhréir le haon ghníomh de chuid dhlí an Aontais Eorpaigh, lena n-áirítear aon tuairim, aon fholáireamh, aon mholadh nó aon chinneadh a dhíreofar chuig an gComhalta de SCE lena mbaineann. De mhaolú ar Airteagal 13(3) agus (4), ní dhéanfar aon MT a chaibidliú.

3. An choinníollacht a ghabhfaidh leis an líne chreidmheasa faoi choinníollacha breisithe, déanfar mionsonrú uirthi san MT, i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 13(3) agus beidh sí comhleanúnach leis na critéir incháilitheachta dá bhforáiltear in Iarscríbhinn III.

4. Déanfar na téarmaí agus na coinníollacha airgeadais a bhaineann leis an gcúnamh airgeadais réamhchúraim ó SCE a shonrú i gcomhaontú um shaoráid cúnaimh airgeadais réamhchúraim a bheidh le síniú ag an Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta.

5. Glacfaidh an Bord Stiúrthóirí na treoirlínte mionsonraithe maidir leis na módúlachtaí i dtaca le cur chun feidhme an chúnaimh airgeadais réamhchúraim ó SCE.

6. Déanfaidh an Bord Stiúrthóirí tuarascáil a ullmhófar i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 13(7) a bhreithniú go tráthrialta, is é sin le rá, gach sé mhí ar a laghad nó tar éis do Chomhaltaí SCE cistí a tharraingt den chéad uair (trí iasacht nó trí cheannach ar an mbunmhargadh). Maidir le líne chreidmheasa faoi choinníoll réamhchúraim, fíorófar sa tuarascáil go bhfuil na critéir incháilitheachta dá dtagraítear i mír 2 den Airteagal seo á n-urramú go leanúnach ach, maidir le líne chreidmheasa faoi choinníollacha breisithe, fíorófar sa tuarascáil go bhfuil na coinníollacha i dtaca le beartais, a shonraítear san MT, á gcomhlíonadh. I gcás inarb é tátal na tuarascála go bhfuil an Comhalta de SCE fós ag urramú na gcritéar incháilitheachta a ghabhann leis an líne chreidmheasa faoi choinníoll réamhchúraim nó ag comhlíonadh na gcoinníollachta a ghabhann leis an líne chreidmheasa faoi choinníollacha breisithe, coimeádfar an líne chreidmheasa mura rud é go n-iarrfaidh an Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta nó aon Stiúrthóir eile cinneadh a dhéanamh, de thoil a chéile, i dtaobh an ceart an líne chreidmheasa a choimeád.

7. Más é tátal na tuarascála sin a ullmhaíodh de bhun mhír 6 den Airteagal seo nach bhfuil an Comhalta de SCE ag urramú a thuilleadh na gcritéar incháilitheachta a ghabhann leis an líne chreidmheasa faoi choinníoll réamhchúraim nó ag comhlíonadh na coinníollachta a ghabhann leis an líne chreidmheasa faoi choinníollacha breisithe, scoirfear den rochtain ar an líne chreidmheasa, mura rud é go gcinnfidh an Bord Stiúrthóirí de thoil a chéile an líne chreidmheasa a choimeád. Más amhlaidh gur tharraing an Comhalta de SCE cistí cheana, cuirfear corrlach breise i bhfeidhm i gcomhréir leis an treoirlíne praghsála a ghlacfaidh an Bord Rialtóirí de bhun Airteagal 20(2), mura rud é go measfaidh an Bord Rialtóirí, ar bhonn na tuarascála, gur de thoradh imthosca a bhí thar smacht an Chomhalta de SCE a rinneadh an neamhchomhlíonadh. Mura gcoimeádfar an líne chreidmheasa, féadfar foirm eile cúnaimh airgeadais a iarraidh agus a dheonú i gcomhréir leis na rialacha is infheidhme faoin gConradh seo.”.

(23) In Airteagal 15, cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad mhír 5:

“5. I gcás inarb infheidhme, déanfaidh an Bord Stiúrthóirí cinneadh, de thoil a chéile, ar fháil togra dó ón Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta agus tar éis tuarascáil a fháil ón Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta agus ón gCoimisiún Eorpach i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 13(7), i dtaobh eisíocaíocht na dtráinsí den chúnamh airgeadais i ndiaidh an chéad tráinse.”.

(24) In Airteagal 16, cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad mhír 5:

“5. Déanfaidh an Bord Stiúrthóirí cinneadh, de thoil a chéile, ar fháil togra dó ón Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta agus tar éis tuarascáil a fháil ón Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta agus ón gCoimisiún Eorpach i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 13(7), i dtaobh eisíocaíocht thráinsí an chúnaimh airgeadais i ndiaidh an chéad tráinse.”.

(25) In Airteagal 17, cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad mhír 5:

“5. Tar éis dóibh togra a fháil ón Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta agus tuarascáil a fháil ón Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta agus ón gCoimisiún Eorpach i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 13(7), déanfaidh an Bord Stiúrthóirí cinneadh, de thoil a chéile, i dtaobh eisíocaíocht cúnaimh airgeadais le Ballstát is tairbhí trí oibríochtaí ar an mbunmhargadh.”.

(26) Cuirtear isteach an t-airteagal seo a leanas:

“AIRTEAGAL 18a

Saoráid chúlstop

1. Ar bhonn iarrata ar shaoráid chúlstop ó BRA agus ar bhonn togra ón Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta, féadfaidh an Bord Rialtóirí cinneadh a dhéanamh saoráid chúlstop a dheonú do BRA lena gcumhdófaí gach úsáid ab fhéidir a bhaint as CRA mar a chumhdaítear i ndlí an Aontais Eorpaigh, ach sin faoi réir coimircí iomchuí a bheith ann.

Tá foráil in Iarscríbhinn IV maidir leis na critéir chun iasachtaí agus eisíocaíochtaí a fhormheas faoin tsaoráid chúlstop. Féadfaidh an Bord Rialtóirí cinneadh a dhéanamh na critéir maidir le formheas iasachtaí agus eisíocaíochtaí a athrú, agus Iarscríbhinn IV a leasú dá réir sin. Tiocfaidh an leasú sin i bhfeidhm a luaithe a bheidh fógra tugtha ag Comhaltaí SCE don Taiscí á rá go bhfuil a nósanna imeachta náisiúnta is infheidhme tugtha i gcrích.

Cinnfidh an Bord Rialtóirí príomhthéarmaí agus príomhchoinníollacha airgeadais na saoráide cúlstop, an uasteorainn ainmniúil agus aon choigeartuithe uirthi sin, forálacha maidir leis an nós imeachta maidir le fíorú chomhlíonadh an choinníll i leith bhuaine an chreata dlí um réiteach bainc agus maidir leis na hiarmhairtí a ghabhfaidh leis sin a mhéid a bhaineann leis an tsaoráid chúlstop agus lena húsáid, agus freisin na coinníollacha ar dá réir a fhéadfaidh an Bord Rialtóirí an tsaoráid chúlstop a fhoirceannadh agus na coinníollacha agus na teorainneacha ama ar dá réir a fhéadfaidh an Bord Rialtóirí cinneadh a dhéanamh an tsaoráid chúlstop a choimeád ar siúl de bhun mhír 8.

2. Is i bhfoirm líne chreidmheasa imrothlach faoina bhféadfar iasachtaí a sholáthar a bheidh an tsaoráid chúlstop.

3. Sonrófar téarmaí agus coinníollacha airgeadais mionsonraithe na saoráide cúlstop i gcomhaontú um shaoráid chúlstop le BRA, a bheidh le formheas ag an mBord Rialtóirí de thoil a chéile agus le síniú ag an Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta.

4. Glacfaidh an Bord Stiúrthóirí na treoirlínte mionsonraithe maidir leis na modúlachtaí lena ndéanfar an tsaoráid chúlstop a chur chun feidhme, lena n‑áirítear treoirlínte maidir le nósanna imeachta lena n-áiritheofar glacadh tapa cinntí de bhun mhír 5, agus athbhreithneoidh siad na treoirlínte sin go tráthrialta.

5. Ar bhonn iarrata ar iasacht ó BRA, ina mbeidh an fhaisnéis ábhartha uile agus, ag an am céanna, urraim á tabhairt do cheanglais rúndachta reachtaíocht an Aontais Eorpaigh, ar bhonn togra ón Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta agus ar bhonn measúnú ar acmhainn aisíocaíochta BRA agus, i gcás inarb ábhartha, ar bhonn na measúnuithe ag an gCoimisiún Eorpach agus ag BCE de bhun mhír 6, déanfaidh an Bord Stiúrthóirí cinneadh de thoil a chéile, agus iad arna dtreorú ag na critéir dá bhforáiltear in Iarscríbhinn IV, maidir le hiasachtaí agus le heisíocaíochtaí a ghabhann leo faoin tsaoráid chúlstop. Féadfaidh an Bord Stiúrthóirí cinneadh a dhéanamh de thoil a chéile na cúraimí dá bhforáiltear sa mhír seo a tharmligean don Stiúrthóir Bainistíochta ar feadh tréimhse shonraithe agus maidir le méid sonraithe, i gcomhréir leis na rialacha a shonrófar sna treoirlínte a ghlacfaidh an Bord Stiúrthóirí.

6. De mhaolú ar Airteagal 4(3), úsáidfear nós imeachta vótála éigeandála i gcás ina dtiocfaidh an Coimisiún Eorpach agus BCE ar an tátal, trí mheasúnuithe ar leithligh, go mbeadh bagairt ann d’inbhuanaitheacht eacnamaíoch agus airgeadais an limistéir euro dá mainneodh an Bord Stiúrthóirí cinneadh cinneadh a ghlacadh go práinneach maidir le hiasachtaí agus le heisíocaíochtaí a ghabhfaidh leo faoin tsaoráid chúlstop de bhun na chéad abairte de mhír 5 den Airteagal seo. Is gá tromlach cáilithe 85% de na vótaí a caitheadh le go bhféadfar cinneadh den sórt sin a ghlacadh de thoil a chéile faoin nós imeachta éigeandála sin. Ní bheidh feidhm ag an mír seo más rud é go bhfuil, agus fad a bheidh, aon nósanna imeachta fós ar siúl a bhaineann le buaine an chreata dlí um réiteach bainc de bhun mhír 8 den Airteagal seo agus le forálacha gaolmhara arna nglacadh ag an mBord Rialtóirí.

I gcás ina n-úsáidtear an nós imeachta éigeandála dá dtagraítear sa chéad fhomhír, déantar aistriú chuig cúlchiste éigeandála chun maolán tiomanta a chruthú chun na priacail a eascraíonn as na hiasachtaí gona n-eisíocaíochtaí a fhormheastar faoin nós imeachta éigeandála sin a chumhdach. Féadfaidh an Bord Stiúrthóirí cinneadh a dhéanamh de thoil a chéile an cúlchiste éigeandála a chealú agus a bhfuil ann a aistriú ar ais chuig an gcúlchiste agus/nó chuig an gcaipiteal íoctha.

Tar éis an nós imeachta éigeandála sin a úsáid den dara huair, cuirfear cur i bhfeidhm na chéad fhomhíre ar fionraí go dtí go gcinnfidh an Bord Rialtóirí an fhionraí sin a chealú. Agus cinneadh á dhéanamh aige an fhionraí sin a chealú, athbhreithneoidh an Bord Rialtóirí an tromlach vótála a theastaíonn is gá chun cinneadh a ghlacadh faoin nós imeachta réamhluaite agus socróidh sé na himthosca ina ndéanfar athbhreithniú eile tráth éigin is faide anonn, agus féadfaidh sé cinneadh a dhéanamh an mhír seo a leasú dá réir sin, gan an tairseach vótála a ísliú. Tiocfaidh an leasú sin i bhfeidhm a luaithe a bheidh fógra tugtha ag Comhaltaí SCE don Taiscí á rá go bhfuil a nósanna imeachta náisiúnta is infheidhme tugtha i gcrích.

7. Bunóidh SCE córas cuí foláirimh chun a áirithiú go bhfaighfear aon aisíocaíochtaí atá dlite faoin tsaoráid chúlstop ar mhodh tráthúil.

8. Maidir leis an tsaoráid chúlstop agus lena húsáid faoin Airteagal seo, beidh siad teagmhasach ar chomhlíonadh an choinníll maidir le buaine an chreata dlí um réiteach bainc. I gcás nach gcomhlíontar an coinníoll maidir le buaine an chreata dlí um réiteach bainc, tionscnófar athbhreithniú cuimsitheach agus beidh gá le cinneadh de chuid an Bhoird Rialtóirí chun an tsaoráid chúlstop a choimeád ar siúl. Déanfaidh an Bord Rialtóirí, de bhun mhír 1, forálacha breise a chinneadh maidir leis an nós imeachta i dtaca le fíorú chomhlíonadh an choinníll maidir le buaine an chreata dlí um réiteach bainc agus maidir leis na hiarmhairtí a ghabhfaidh leis sin a mhéid a bhaineann leis an tsaoráid chúlstop agus lena húsáid.

9. Chun críche mhír 8 den Airteagal seo, cuimseoidh buaine an chreata dlí um réiteach bainc an méid seo a leanas:

(a) buaine, mar a shainítear in Airteagal 9(1) de Chomhaontú Idir-rialtasach an 21 Bealtaine 2014 maidir le haistriú agus frithpháirtiú ranníocaíochtaí leis an gCiste Réitigh Aonair (‘CIR’), na rialacha a shainítear in Airteagal 9(1) de CIR; agus

(b) buaine na bprionsabal agus na rialacha a bhaineann leis an uirlis fortharrthála agus leis an gcreat maidir le híoscheanglas le haghaidh cistí dílse agus dliteanais incháilithe a leagtar síos sa Treoir maidir le Téarnamh agus Réiteach na mBanc, sa Rialachán maidir leis an Sásra Réitigh Aonair agus i Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 575/2013 ó Pharlaimint na hEorpa agus ón gComhairle an 26 Meitheamh 2013 maidir le ceanglais stuamachta i gcomhair institiúidí creidmheasa agus gnólachtaí infheistíochta agus lena leasaítear Rialachán (AE) Uimh. 648/2012 ⁵ , a mhéid is ábhartha na prionsabail agus na rialacha sin i dtaca le hacmhainn airgeadais CRA a chaomhnú.

10. Agus an tAirteagal seo á chur chun feidhme aige, oibreoidh SCE i ndlúthchomhar leis na Ballstáit Rannpháirteacha a ghlacfaidh páirt i gcomhar le SCE i maoiniú faoin gcúlstop i gcomhair CRA.”.

(27) In Airteagal 19, cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad an teidil:

“Athbhreithniú agus leasuithe ar liosta na n-ionstraimí cúnaimh airgeadais”.

(28) In Airteagal 20, cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad mhíreanna 1 agus 2:

“1. Le linn dó tacaíocht chobhsaíochta nó maoiniú faoin gcúlstop a dheonú i gcomhair CRA, beidh sé mar aidhm ag SCE a chostais maoinithe agus oibriúcháin a chumhdach go hiomlán agus cuirfidh sé corrlach cuí san áireamh.

2. I gcás gach ionstraime cúnaimh airgeadais agus gach maoinithe faoin gcúlstop i gcomhair CRA, déanfar an phraghsáil a mhionsonrú i dtreoirlíne praghsála, agus glacfaidh an Bord Rialtóirí an treoirlíne sin.”.

(29) In Airteagal 21, cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad mhír 1:

“1. Cumhachtófar do SCE iasachtaí a fháil ar na margaí caipitil ó bhainc, ó institiúidí airgeadais nó ó dhaoine nó ó institiúidí eile ar mhaithe lena chuspóirí a chomhlíonadh.”.

(30) In Airteagal 30, cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad mhír 5:

“5. Cuirfidh an Bord Rialtóirí an tuarascáil bhliantúil ar fáil do pharlaimintí náisiúnta agus institiúidí uachtaracha iniúchóireachta Chomhaltaí SCE, do Chúirt Iniúchóirí na hEorpa agus do Pharlaimint na hEorpa.”.

(31) In Airteagal 37, cuirtear an mhír seo a leanas leis:

“4. Aon díospóid idir Comhaltaí de SCE mar gheall ar chomhlíonadh an choinníll maidir le buaine an chreata dlí um réiteach bainc a leagtar síos in Airteagal 18a, féadfar í a chur faoi bhráid Chúirt Bhreithiúnais an Aontais Eorpaigh i gcomhréir leis an nós imeachta a chinnfidh an Bord Rialtóirí de bhun Airteagal 18a(1) agus (8). An breithiúnas a thabharfaidh Cúirt Bhreithiúnais an Aontais Eorpaigh, beidh sé ceangailteach ar na páirtithe sa nós imeachta; feidhmeoidh SCE i gcomhréir leis an mbreithiúnas sin.”.

(32) In Airteagal 38, cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad na míre aonair atá ann:

“D’fhonn a chuspóirí a chur ar aghaidh, beidh SCE i dteideal comhoibriú, faoi chuimsiú théarmaí an Chonartha seo, le CAI, le haon Stát atá ag soláthar cúnamh airgeadais ar bhonn ad hoc do Chomhalta de SCE, le haon Bhallstát de chuid an Aontais Eorpaigh agus le haon eagraíocht nó le haon eintiteas idirnáisiúnta ar a bhfuil freagrachtaí i réimsí gaolmhara.”.

(33) In Airteagal 40, cuirtear an mhír seo a leanas leis:

“4. Gan dochar d’Airteagail 8 go 11 agus 39, féadfaidh an Bord Rialtóirí, d’fhonn an t-aistriú dá dtagraítear i mír 2 den Airteagal seo a éascú, tráinse breise caipitil údaraithe a chruthú, a bheidh le suibscríobh ag cuid de scairshealbhóirí SaorCAE nó ag scairshealbhóirí uile SaorCAE i gcomhréir leis an treoir ranníoca a leagtar amach in Iarscríbhinn 2 a ghabhann le Creat-Chomhaontú SaorCAE a síníodh an 10 Meitheamh 2010 (faoi mar a leasaíodh é). Is éard a bheidh sa tráinse breise, caipiteal inghlaoite; ní bheidh aon chearta vótála aige (fiú má ghlaoitear caipiteal den sórt sin), agus beidh sé faoi réir uasmhéid a fhreagróidh do phríomhshuim chomhiomlán neamhíoctha na saoráidí iasachta SaorCAE a aistríodh arna iolrú faoi chéatadán nach airde ná 165%. Cinnfidh an Bord Rialtóirí modh agus imthosca na nglaonna ar chaipiteal agus na n-íocaíochtaí caipitil faoin tráinse breise.

Ní mhéadóidh an t-aistriú dá dtagraítear i mír 2 suim dhliteanais SaorCAE agus SCE i gcomparáid leis an gcás a bheadh ann mura ndéanfaí an t-aistriú sin. Tacóidh an tráinse breise le haistriú iasachtaí SaorCAE agus laghdófar é i gcomhréir le haisíoc na n-iasachtaí sin.

Tiocfaidh an cinneadh ón mBord Rialtóirí faoin gcéad fhomhír i bhfeidhm a luaithe a bheidh fógra tugtha ag Comhaltaí SCE don Taiscí á rá go bhfuil a nósanna imeachta náisiúnta is infheidhme tugtha i gcrích.”.

(34) In Airteagal 45, cuirtear an méid seo a leanas in ionad phointí 1 agus 2:

“1) Iarscríbhinn I: Treoir ranníoca SCE;

2) Iarscríbhinn II: Suibscríobhanna an stoic chaipitiúil údaraithe;

3) Iarscríbhinn III: Critéir incháilitheachta le haghaidh cúnamh airgeadais réamhchúraim SCE; agus

4) Iarscríbhinn IV: Critéir le haghaidh formheas iasachtaí agus eisíocaíochtaí faoin tsaoráid chúlstop.”.

(35) Cuirtear an téacs seo a leanas leis mar Iarscríbhinn III:

“IARSCRÃ?BHINN III

Critéir incháilitheachta le haghaidh cúnamh airgeadais réamhchúraim SCE

1. Is iad na critéir seo thíos na critéir incháilitheachta le haghaidh cúnamh airgeadais réamhchúraim SCE agus cinneadh iad ag féachaint don mhéid seo a leanas:

(a) Ráiteas Chruinniú Mullaigh Euro an 14 Nollaig 2018 inar formhuiníodh an bhileog téarmaí maidir le hathchóiriú SCE, agus a sonraíodh go ndéanfar soiléiriú ar chritéir measúnaithe ex ante lena ndéanfaí measúnú i dtaca le feidhmíocht fhónta eacnamaíoch agus airgeadais, agus go leanfaidh an ionstraim um líne chreidmheasa faoi choinníollacha breisithe (‘LCCB’) de bheith ar fáil mar a bhforáiltear i dtreoirlínte SCE mar atá; agus

(b) an comhsheasamh maidir leis an gcomhar sa todhchaí idir an Coimisiún Eorpach agus SCE, ar comhsheasamh é atá i gceangal leis an mbileog téarmaí maidir le hathchóiriú SCE, agus, chomh maith leis sin, maidir leis na róil agus na hinniúlachtaí a bheidh ag institiúidí de réir mar a bhforáiltear i gcreat dlí an Aontais Eorpaigh.

Thairis sin, ag cur san áireamh gur de bhun Airteagail 13 agus 14 den Chonradh seo a dhéantar de réir an nós imeachta maidir le cúnamh airgeadais réamhchúraim SCE a dheonú, agus ag cur san áireamh go bhféadfaidh an Bord Rialtóirí, de réir Airteagal 14(1) den Chonradh seo, cinneadh a dhéanamh cúnamh airgeadais réamhchúraim a dheonú do Chomhalta de SCE arb inbhuanaithe a fhiachas rialtais, agus go nglacfaidh an Bord Stiúrthóirí na treoirlínte mionsonraithe maidir le módúlachtaí lena ndéanfar cúnamh airgeadais réamhchúraim SCE a chur chun feidhme i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 14(5) den Chonradh seo,

2. Critéir incháilitheachta le haghaidh líne creidmheasa faoi choinníoll réamhchúraim (‘LCCR’) a dheonú:

Maidir le rochtain ar LCCR, beidh an rochtain sin bunaithe ar chritéir incháilitheachta agus beidh sí teoranta do Chomhaltaí de SCE a bhfuil a mbunstaid eacnamaíocha agus airgeadais láidir agus a bhfuil a bhfiachas rialtais inbhuanaithe. De ghnáth, is gá do Chomhaltaí de SCE tagarmharcanna cainníochtúla a bhaineann le faireachas AE a shroicheadh agus is gá dóibh coinníollacha cáilíochtúla a bhaineann le faireachas AE a chomhlíonadh. Is ar bhonn na gcritéar seo a leanas a dhéanfar measúnú i dtaobh an bhfuil Comhalta de SCE, ar tairbhí ionchasach é, cáilithe chun LCCR a fháil:

(a) urramú na dtagarmharcanna buiséadacha cainníochtúla. Ní bheidh an Comhalta de SCE faoi réir nós imeachta um easnamh iomarcach agus is gá go mbeadh na trí thagarmharc seo a leanas sroichte aige sa dá bhliain roimh an iarraidh ar chúnamh airgeadais réamhchúraim:

(i) easnamh rialtais ginearálta nach mó ná 3% de OTI;

(ii) comhardú buiséadach struchtúrach rialtais ginearálta atá comhionann leis an íos-tagarmharc tírshonrach^* nó atá níos airde ná é;

(iii) tagarmharc fiachais a chuimsíonn cóimheas fiachais rialtais ghinearálta-OTI is ísle ná 60% nó laghdú sa difreálach i dtaca le 60% i gcaitheamh an dá bhliain roimhe sin ag meánráta aon fhichiú amháin sa bhliain;

(b) gan aon ró-mhíchothromaíochtaí a bheith ann. Níor cheart an Comhalta de SCE a bheith aitheanta mar chomhalta ag a bhfuil ró-mhíchothromaíochtaí faoi fhaireachas AE;

(c) teist maidir le rochtain ar mhargaí caipitil idirnáisiúnta, i gcás inarb ábhartha, ar théarmaí réasúnacha;

(d) staidfiachais sheachtraigh atá inbhuanaithe; agus

(e) gan aon ghéarleochaileachtaí a bheith ann san earnáil airgeadais, ar leochaileachtaí iad a chuireann cobhsaíocht airgeadais an Chomhalta de SCE i bpriacail.

3. Critéir incháilitheachta le haghaidh LCCB a dheonú

Beidh rochtain ar LCCB ar fáil do Chomhaltaí de SCE nach bhfuil incháilithe le haghaidh LCCR de bharr neamhchomhlíonadh roinnt critéar incháilitheachta ach a bhfuil a staid ginearálta eacnamaíoch agus airgeadais láidir agus a bhfiachas rialtais inbhuanaithe.”.

(36) Cuirtear an téacs seo a leanas leis mar Iarscríbhinn IV:

“IARSCRÃ?BHINN IV

Critéir le haghaidh formheas iasachtaí agus eisíocaíochtaí faoin tsaoráid chúlstop

1. Is é rud atá sna critéir thíosluaite critéir le haghaidh formheas iasachtaí agus eisíocaíochtaí faoin tsaoráid chúlstop, agus cinneadh iad ag féachaint don mhéid seo a leanas:

(a) Téarmaí tagartha an chúlstop choitinn i gcomhair CRA a formhuiníodh ag Cruinniú Mullaigh Euro an 14 Nollaig 2018;

(b) Aithris 15b den Chonradh seo lena meabhraítear go bhforáiltear, i dtéarmaí tagartha an chúlstop choitinn i gcomhair CRA a formhuiníodh ag Cruinniú Mullaigh Euro an 14 Nollaig 2018, do chritéir le haghaidh eisíocaíochtaí faoin tsaoráid chúlstop lena n-áirítear inter alia prionsabail na rogha deiridh agus na neodrachta buiséadaí ar feadh an mheántéarma, lán-chomhlíonadh an Rialacháin maidir leis an Sásra Réitigh Aonair agus na Treorach maidir le Téarnamh agus Réiteach na mBanc, agus buaine an chreata dlí;

(c) Airteagal 12(1a) den Chonradh seo ina sonraítear nach ndeonófar iasachtaí faoin tsaoráid chúlstop ach amháin mar rogha dheiridh agus, a mhéid agus a bheidh neodracht bhuiséadach ar feadh an mheántéarma ag baint leis sin;

(d) Airteagal 18a(8) den Chonradh seo ina sonraítear, maidir leis an tsaoráid chúlstop agus maidir lena húsáid, go mbeidh siad teagmhasach ar chomhlíonadh an choinníll maidir le buaine an chreata dlí um réiteach bainc, agus go gcinnfidh an Bord Rialtóirí de bhun Airteagal 18a(1) den Chonradh seo forálacha breise maidir leis an nós imeachta i dtaca le fíorú chomhlíonadh an choinníoll sin agus i dtaca leis na hiarmhairtí a ghabhfaidh leis sin a mhéid a bhaineann leis an tsaoráid chúlstop agus lena húsáid;

(e) Airteagal 18a(5) den Chonradh seo ina sonraítear go ndéanfaidh an Bord Stiúrthóirí cinneadh de thoil a chéile, agus iad arna dtreorú ag na critéir dá bhforáiltear san Iarscríbhinn seo, maidir le hiasachtaí agus le heisíocaíochtaí faoin tsaoráid chúlstop,

agus á chur san áireamh gur de bhun Airteagal 18a den Chonradh seo a dhéantar an nós imeachta maidir le deonú agus cur chun feidhme na saoráide cúlstop a chur i gcrích agus go nglacfaidh an Bord Stiúrthóirí treoirlínte mionsonraithe maidir leis na módúlachtaí maidir le cur chun feidhme na saoráide cúlstop i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 18a(4) den Chonradh seo.

2. Critéir le haghaidh formheas iasachtaí agus eisíocaíochtaí faoin tsaoráid chúlstop:

(a) Is mar rogha dheiridh a dtéitear ar iontaoibh na saoráide cúlstop. Dá bhrí sin:

(i) tá na hacmhainní airgeadais CRA atá ar fáil lena n-úsáid i gcomhréir le hAirteagal 76 den Rialachán maidir leis an Sásra Réitigh Aonair agus nach bhfuil geallta cheana i gcomhair gníomhaíochtaí réitigh ídithe, lena n-áirítear an cás ina bhfuil acmhainní airgeadais ar fáil in CRA, ach nach leor na hacmhainní sin don chás réitigh lena mbaineann;

(ii) níl na ranníocaíochtaí ex post leordhóthanach nó níl fáil orthu láithreach; agus

(iii) ní féidir le BRA iasacht a fháil ar théarmaí agus ar choinníollacha a measann BRA ina leith, i gcomhréir le hAirteagail 73 agus 74 den Rialachán maidir leis an Sásra Réitigh Aonair, go bhfuil siad inghlactha;

(b) Táthar ag urramú phrionsabal sin na neodrachta buiséadaí ar feadh an mheántéarma. Tá acmhainn aisíocaíochta BRA leordhóthanach chun na hiasachtaí a dheonófar faoin tsaoráid chúlstop a aisíoc laistigh den mheántéarma;

(c) Tá teacht ag SCE ar na cistí a iarradh. I gcás eisíocaíochtaí airgid thirim, tá na cistí faighte ag SCE ar théarmaí atá inghlactha ag SCE nó, i gcás eisíocaíochtaínach ndéantar le hairgead tirim, tá ná nótaí cruthaithe go dlíthiúil agus tá siad á sealbhú faoi choimeád na taisclainne urrús is infheidhme;

(d) Na páirtithe uile sa Chomhaontú Idir-rialtasach, arb ina gcríocha a fheidhmeoidh an beart réitigh ábhartha, tá a n-oibleagáidí comhlíonta acu maidir le ranníocaíochtaí a fuarthas ó institiúidí údaraithe ina gcríocha a aistriú chuig CRA;

(e) Níl ar siúl aon teagmhas mainneachtana maidir le hiasachtaí BRA ó SCE nó ó aon chreidiúnaí eile, sin nó tá plean réitigh i leith teagmhais dá chineál curtha ar fáil ag BRA agus tá an plean sin chun sástachta an Bhoird Stiúrthóirí;

(f) An coinníoll maidir le buaine an chreata dlí um réiteach bainc mar a shainítear in Airteagal 18a(9) den Chonradh seo, tá sé comhlíonta, de réir chinneadh an Bhoird Rialtóirí de bhun Airteagal 18a(1) agus (8) den Chonradh seo; agus

(g) Comhlíonann an scéim réitigh thiomanta dlí an Aontais Eorpaigh go hiomlán agus tháinig sí i bhfeidhm i gcomhréir le dlí an Aontais Eorpaigh.”.

AIRTEAGAL 2

TAISCEADH

Déanfar an Comhaontú Leasaitheach seo a thaisceadh le hArdrúnaíocht Chomhairle an Aontais Eorpaigh (“an Taiscí”), agus cuirfidh an Taiscí cóipeanna deimhnithe chuig na Sínitheoirí uile.

AIRTEAGAL 3

COMHDHLÚTHÚ

Déanfaidh an Taiscí leagan comhdhlúite den Chonradh lena mBunaítear an Sásra Cobhsaíochta Eorpach a ullmhú agus cuirfidh sé chuig na Sínitheoirí uile é.

AIRTEAGAL 4

DAINGNIÚ, FORMHEAS NÓ GLACADH

1. Beidh an Comhaontú Leasaitheach seo faoi réir a dhaingnithe, a fhormheasa nó a ghlactha ag na Sínitheoirí. Déanfar ionstraimí daingniúcháin, formheasa nó glactha a thaisceadh leis an Taiscí.

2. Cuirfidh an Taiscí fógra chuig na Sínitheoirí eile maidir le gach taisceadh agus an dáta a dhéantar é.

AIRTEAGAL 5

TEACHT I BHFEIDHM AGUS AONTACHAS

1. Tiocfaidh an Comhaontú Leasaitheach seo i bhfeidhm an dáta a bheidh na hionstraimí daingniúcháin, formheasa nó glactha taiscthe ag na Sínitheoirí uile.

2. Sula dtiocfaidh an Comhaontú Leasaitheach seo i bhfeidhm, beidh sé ar oscailt le go mbeidh Ballstáit de chuid an Aontais Eorpaigh a aontaíonn don Chonradh lena mBunaítear an Sásra Cobhsaíochta Eorpach in ann aontú dó i gcomhréir le hAirteagail 2 agus 44 den Chonradh sin.

Maidir le hAirteagail 2 agus 44 den Chonradh lena mBunaítear an Sásra Cobhsaíochta Eorpach, beidh feidhm acu freisin maidir le haontachas don Chomhaontú Leasaitheach seo.

Beidh de cheangal ar an mBallstát aontach an t-iarratas ar aontachas don Chomhaontú Leasaitheach a thíolacadh an tráth céanna a ndéantar an t-iarratas ar aontachas don Chonradh lena mBunaítear an Sásra Cobhsaíochta Eorpach. Maidir le formheas an iarratais ag an mBord Rialtóirí faoi Airteagal 44 den Chonradh lena mBunaítear an Sásra Cobhsaíochta Eorpach, tiocfaidh an formheas sin i bhfeidhm tráth a thaiscfear go comhuaineach na hionstraimí aontachais don Chonradh lena mBunaítear an Sásra Cobhsaíochta Eorpach agus don Chomhaontú Leasaitheach seo araon.

Arna dhéanamh i scríbhinn bhunaidh amháin, a bhfuil comhúdarás ag a téacsanna sa Bhéarla, san Eastóinis, san Fhionlainnis, sa Fhraincis, sa Ghaeilge, sa Ghearmáinis, sa Ghréigis, san Iodáilis, sa Laitvis, sa Liotuáinis, sa Mháltais, san Ollainnis, sa Phortaingéilis, sa tSlóvaicis, sa tSlóivéinis, sa Spáinnis agus sa tSualainnis.

PART 2

Text of Amending Agreement in the English Language

AGREEMENT

AMENDING THE TREATY

ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM

BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,

THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA, IRELAND, THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC,

THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,

THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC, THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA,

THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA, THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG,

THE REPUBLIC OF MALTA, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS,

THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA, THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC,

THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA, THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

AND THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND

PREAMBLE

THE CONTRACTING PARTIES, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Finland (the “euro area Member States” or the “Signatories”);

RECOGNISING the agreement to mobilise funding and to provide backstop financing for the purposes of the use of the Single Resolution Fund (“SRF”), owned by the Single Resolution Board (“SRB”) established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010⁶ ;

RECOGNISING the key contribution of the European Stability Mechanism (“ESM”) in crisis management by providing timely and effectively stability support to euro area Member States;

HAVING AGREED on a comprehensive package to further strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union;

AIMING at a further development of the ESM to strengthen the resilience and crisis resolution capabilities of the euro area, while continuing to fully respect European Union law;

RECALLING that at the Euro Summit of 29 June 2018 in inclusive format, the Heads of State or Government of the Member States whose currency is the euro stated that the ESM will provide the common backstop to the SRF and be strengthened on the basis of the elements set out in the letter of the President of the Euro Group dated 25 June 2018;

FURTHER RECALLING that at the Euro Summit of 14 December 2018 in inclusive format, the Heads of State or Government of the Member States whose currency is the euro endorsed the terms of reference of said common backstop and a term sheet on the reform of the ESM, and that, at the Euro Summit of 21 June 2019 in inclusive format, the Heads of State or Government of the Member States whose currency is the euro took note of the broad agreement reached on the revision of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE 1

Amendments to the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism

The Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism is amended as follows:

A. The preamble is amended as follows:

(1) Recital (4) is replaced by the following:

“(4) Strict observance of the European Union legal framework, the integrated framework for fiscal and macro-economic surveillance, in particular the Stability and Growth Pact, the macroeconomic imbalances framework and the economic governance rules of the European Union, should remain the first line of defence against confidence crises affecting the stability of the euro area.”.

(2) The following recitals are inserted:

“(5a) At the Euro Summit of 29 June 2018 in inclusive format, the Heads of State or Government of the Member States whose currency is the euro stated that the ESM will provide the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (‘SRF’) and be strengthened on the basis of the elements set out in the letter of the President of the Euro Group dated 25 June 2018. At the Euro Summit of 14 December 2018 in inclusive format, the Heads of State or Government of the Member States whose currency is the euro endorsed the terms of reference of said common backstop to be provided by the ESM, as well as a term sheet on the reform of the ESM. The term sheet on the reform of the ESM foresees that at the latest by the end of the transitional period, the common backstop to the SRF will be established. The term sheet on the reform of the ESM also foresees that the effectiveness of precautionary financial assistance instruments will be enhanced for ESM Members with sound economic fundamentals, which could be affected by an adverse shock beyond their control. In line with the joint position on future cooperation between the European Commission and the ESM as annexed to the term sheet on the reform of the ESM regarding the eligibility assessment under the precautionary credit line, depending on the precise scope of the eligibility criteria, the European Commission and the ESM will assume their respective roles in line with the law of the European Union, this Treaty and ESM guidelines. The term sheet on the reform of the ESM also foresees that an additional margin will be applied where an ESM Member having been granted ESM precautionary financial assistance fails to comply with the conditionality attached to it after having drawn funds, unless such non-compliance is due to events beyond the control of the government. The term sheet on the reform of the ESM furthermore highlights that conditionality remains an underlying principle of this Treaty and all ESM instruments, but the exact terms need to be adapted to each instrument.

(5b) The joint position on future cooperation between the ESM and the European Commission sets out the agreement on new modalities of cooperation within and outside financial assistance programmes. The European Commission and the ESM share common objectives and will exercise specific tasks related to crisis management for the euro area on the basis of European Union law and this Treaty. Therefore, the two institutions will work closely together on ESM crisis management measures with an efficient governance in pursuit of financial stability by complementing expertise. The European Commission ensures consistency with European Union law, in particular with the economic policy coordination framework. The ESM performs its analysis and assessment from the perspective of a lender. The joint position on future cooperation will be fully incorporated in a memorandum of cooperation, as set out in Article 13(8), when the amendments to this Treaty enter into force.”.

(3) In recital (7), the following sentence is added:

“ESM Members acknowledge the current dialogue between the Managing Director and the European Parliament.”.

(4) In recital (8), the third sentence is replaced by the following:

“A euro area Member State requesting financial assistance from the ESM is expected to address, whenever appropriate, a similar request to the IMF.”.

(5) The following recital is inserted:

“(9a) Member States of the European Union whose currency is not the euro and which have established a close cooperation with the European Central Bank (‘ECB’) in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions⁷ are expected to provide parallel credit lines for the SRF alongside the ESM. Those Member States will participate in the common backstop on equivalent terms (‘Participating Member States’). Representatives of Participating Member States should be invited to attend meetings of the Board of Governors and Board of Directors as observers in which matters regarding the common backstop will be discussed and should have the same access to information. Appropriate arrangements for sharing of information and timely coordination between the ESM and Participating Member States should be established. It should be possible to invite representatives of the Single Resolution Board (‘SRB’) as observers on an ad hoc basis to attend meetings of the Board of Governors and the Board of Directors in which backstop financing will be discussed.”.

(6) Recital (10) is replaced by the following:

“(10) On 20 June 2011, the representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Union authorised the Contracting Parties of this Treaty to request the European Commission and the ECB to perform the tasks provided for in this Treaty. It is acknowledged that the duties conferred within this Treaty on the European Commission and the ECB do not entail any powers to make decisions of their own and that the tasks executed by those two institutions on the basis of this Treaty solely commit the ESM.”.

(7) In recital (11), the following sentences are added:

“Following the introduction of these CACs as of 1 January 2013, ESM Members commit to introduce CACs providing for single-limb aggregated voting (‘single-limb CACs’) by 2022. The detailed legal modalities will be agreed within the Economic and Financial Committee, taking into account national constitutional requirements, so that single-limb CACs will be implemented by all ESM Members in new euro area government securities in a way which ensures that their legal impact is identical.”.

(8) The following recitals are inserted:

“(11a) Upon request by an ESM Member and where appropriate, the ESM may facilitate the dialogue between that ESM Member and its private investors on a voluntary, informal, non-binding, temporary, and confidential basis.

(11b) The ESM should provide stability support only to ESM Members whose debt is considered sustainable and whose repayment capacity to the ESM is confirmed. The assessment of debt sustainability and repayment capacity will be carried out on a transparent and predictable basis, while allowing for sufficient margin of judgment. Such assessments will be carried out by the European Commission in liaison with the ECB, and the ESM and wherever appropriate and possible together with the IMF in line with this Treaty, European Union law and the memorandum of cooperation entered into pursuant to Article 13(8). Where the collaboration does not yield a common view, the European Commission will make the overall assessment of the sustainability of public debt, while the ESM will assess the capacity of the ESM Member concerned to repay the ESM.”.

(9) Recital (12) is replaced by the following:

“(12) In exceptional cases, an adequate and proportionate form of private sector involvement, in accordance with IMF practice, shall be considered in cases where stability support is provided accompanied by conditionality in the form of a macro-economic adjustment programme.”.

(10) In recital (13), the following sentence is added:

“Backstop loans to the SRB by the ESM are to enjoy preferred creditor status in a similar fashion to other ESM loans.”.

(11) Recital 14 is replaced by the following:

“(14) The euro area Member States will support equivalent creditor status of the ESM and that of other States lending bilaterally in coordination with the ESM, including in relation to backstop loans to the SRB.”.

(12) The following recitals are inserted:

“(15a) Article 2(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) sets out that the Member States of the European Union shall coordinate their economic policies within arrangements determined by the TFEU. In accordance with Articles 5(1) TFEU and 121 TFEU the Member States of the European Union are to coordinate their economic policies within the Council of the European Union. Accordingly, the ESM should not serve the purpose of economic policies coordination among ESM Members for which European Union law provides the necessary arrangements. The ESM respects the powers conferred by European Union law on the Union institutions and bodies.

(15b) ESM Members recognise that swift and efficient decision-making under the backstop facility and coordination with Participating Member States participating alongside the ESM in backstop financing for the SRF is critical to ensure the effectiveness of the common backstop and of resolutions financed therewith, as reflected by the terms of reference of the common backstop endorsed by the Heads of State or Government of the Member States whose currency is the euro at the Euro Summit of 14 December 2018 in inclusive format. The terms of reference foresee criteria for disbursements under the backstop facility including inter alia the principles of last resort and fiscal neutrality over the medium term, full compliance with Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010⁸ (‘SRMR’) and with Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012⁹ (‘BRRD’), and permanence of the legal framework. The terms of reference foresee a decision by the ESM on the use of the backstop, as a rule, within 12 hours as of the request by the SRB, extendable by the Managing Director to 24 hours in exceptional cases, especially in the case of a particularly complex resolution operation, while respecting national constitutional requirements.”.

(13) Recital 16 is replaced by the following:

“(16) The independence of the Managing Director and staff of the ESM is recognised by this Treaty. It should be exercised in a manner such that, where relevant and as provided for in this Treaty, consistency is preserved with European Union law, whose application is overseen by the European Commission.”.

(14) Recital 17 is replaced by the following:

“(17) Disputes concerning the interpretation and application of this Treaty arising between the Contracting Parties or between the Contracting Parties and the ESM should be submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in accordance with Article 273 TFEU.

(18) The ESM will establish appropriate warning systems with the aim of ensuring that it receives any repayments due under stability support or the backstop facility in a timely manner. Post-programme surveillance will be carried out by the European Commission in liaison with the ECB, and by the Council of the European Union within the framework laid down pursuant to Articles 121 and 136 TFEU,”.

B. The Articles are amended as follows:

(15) Article 3 is replaced by the following:

“ARTICLE 3

Purposes

1. The purpose of the ESM shall be to mobilise funding and provide stability support under strict conditionality, appropriate to the financial assistance instrument chosen, to the benefit of ESM Members which are experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing problems, if indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States. Where relevant in order to internally prepare and enable it to appropriately and in a timely manner pursue the tasks conferred on it by this Treaty, the ESM may follow and assess the macroeconomic and financial situation of its Members including the sustainability of their public debt and carry out analysis of relevant information and data. To this end, the Managing Director shall collaborate with the European Commission and the ECB to ensure full consistency with the framework for economic policy coordination provided for in the TFEU.

2. The ESM may provide the backstop facility to the SRB for the SRF to support the application of the resolution tools and exercise of resolution powers of the SRB as enshrined in European Union law.

3. For these purposes, the ESM shall be entitled to raise funds by issuing financial instruments or by entering into financial or other agreements or arrangements with ESM Members, financial institutions or other third parties.

4. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, the conditionality applied shall be appropriate to the financial assistance instrument chosen, as laid down in this Treaty.”.

(16) In Article 4(4), the first sentence is replaced by the following:

“By way of derogation from paragraph 3 of this Article, an emergency voting procedure shall be used where the European Commission and the ECB both conclude that a failure to urgently adopt a decision to grant or implement financial assistance, as defined in Articles 13 to 18, would threaten the economic and financial sustainability of the euro area.”.

(17) Article 5 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 4, the following sentence is added:

“Representatives of Participating Member States participating alongside the ESM in backstop financing for the SRF shall also be invited to participate, as observers, in the meetings of the Board of Governors when matters regarding the common backstop will be discussed.”;

(b) paragraph 6 is amended as follows:

(i) point (a) is replaced by the following:

“(a) to cancel the emergency reserve fund and transfer its content back to the reserve fund and/or paid-in capital, in accordance with Article 4(4), to cancel the suspension of the application of the first subparagraph of Article 18a(6), to change the voting majority required for an adoption of a decision on loans and respective disbursements under the backstop facility under the emergency voting procedure and set the circumstances in which a review is to take place in the future, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 18a(6) ;”;

(ii) point (f) is replaced by the following:

“(f) to provide stability support by the ESM, including the economic policy conditionality as stated in the memorandum of understanding referred to in Article 13(3) or as referred to in Article 14(2), and to establish the choice of instruments and the financial terms and conditions, in accordance with Articles 12 to 18;”;

(iii) the following point is inserted:

“(fa) to change the eligibility criteria for precautionary financial assistance set out in Annex III in accordance with Article 14(1) ;”;

(iv) point (g) is replaced by the following:

“(g) to entrust (i) the Managing Director and (ii) the European Commission in liaison with the ECB, together to negotiate the economic policy conditionality attached to financial assistance, in accordance with Article 13(3) ;”;

(v) the following point is inserted:

“(ga) to grant a backstop facility, in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 18a(1), to change the criteria for the approval of loans and disbursements under the backstop facility set out in Annex IV in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 18a(1), to determine any of the elements set out in the third subparagraph of Article 18a(1), and to decide on the termination or continuation of such backstop facility in accordance with Article 18a(1) and (8) ;”;

(vi) point (h) is replaced by the following:

“(h) to change the pricing policy and pricing guideline for financial assistance or the backstop facility for the SRF, in accordance with Article 20;”;

(vii) point (j) is replaced by the following:

“(j) to establish the modalities of the transfer of EFSF support to the ESM, including the creation of an additional tranche of authorised capital, in accordance with Article 40;”.

(18) Article 6 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 3, the following sentence is added:

“Representatives of Participating Member States participating alongside the ESM in backstop financing for the SRF shall also be invited to participate, as observers, in the meetings of the Board of Directors when matters regarding the common backstop will be discussed.”;

(b) paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

“4. Other persons, including representatives of institutions or organisations, may be invited by the Board of Directors to attend meetings as observers on an ad hoc basis.”.

(19) In Article 7(4), the following sentence is added:

“The Managing Director and the staff of the ESM shall be responsible only to the ESM and shall be completely independent in the performance of their duties.”.

(20) Article 12 is amended as follows:

(a) the following paragraph is inserted:

“1a. The ESM may provide the backstop facility for the SRF, without prejudice to European Union law and the competences of European Union institutions and bodies. Loans under the backstop facility shall only be granted as a last resort and to the extent that it is fiscally neutral in the medium term.”;

(b) in paragraph 3, the following sentence is added:

“Single-limb aggregated voting shall apply to all new euro area government securities, with maturity above one year, issued on or after 1 January 2022.”;

(c) the following paragraph is added:

“4. When exercising the tasks conferred on it in this Treaty, the European Commission will ensure that financial assistance operations provided by the ESM under this Treaty are, where relevant, consistent with European Union law, in particular with the measures of economic policy coordination provided for in the TFEU.”.

(21) Article 13 is amended as follows:

(a) paragraph 1 is amended as follows:

(i) the introductory wording is replaced by the following:

“1. An ESM Member may address a request for stability support to the Chairperson of the Board of Governors. Such a request shall indicate the financial assistance instrument(s) to be considered. On receipt of such a request, both (i) the Managing Director and (ii) the European Commission in liaison with the ECB, shall be entrusted by the Chairperson of the Board of Governors to together discharge the following tasks:”;

(ii) point (b) is replaced by the following;

“(b) to assess whether public debt is sustainable and whether stability support can be repaid. This assessment shall be conducted in a transparent and predictable manner while allowing for sufficient margin of judgment. Wherever appropriate and possible, such an assessment is expected to be conducted together with the IMF;”;

(b) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

“2. On the basis of the request of the ESM Member and the assessments referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, a proposal by the Managing Director based on these assessments and, where applicable, the positive assessments referred to in Article 14(1) and (2), the Board of Governors may decide to grant, in principle, stability support to the ESM Member concerned in the form of a financial assistance facility.”;

(c) in paragraph 3, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

“3. If a decision pursuant to paragraph 2 is adopted other than with respect to a precautionary conditioned credit line, the Board of Governors shall entrust (i) the Managing Director and (ii) the European Commission in liaison with the ECB, together and, wherever possible, also together with the IMF, with the task of negotiating, with the ESM Member concerned, a memorandum of understanding (an ‘MoU’) detailing the conditionality attached to the financial assistance facility. The content of the MoU shall reflect the severity of the weaknesses to be addressed and the financial assistance instrument chosen. The Managing Director shall prepare a proposal for a financial assistance facility agreement, including the financial terms and conditions and the choice of instruments, to be adopted by the Board of Governors.”;

(d) paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

“4. The MoU shall be signed on behalf of the ESM by the European Commission and the Managing Director, subject to prior compliance with the conditions set out in paragraph 3 and approval by the Board of Governors.”;

(e) paragraph 7 is replaced by the following:

“7. Both (i) the Managing Director and (ii) the European Commission in liaison with the ECB, together and, wherever possible, also together with the IMF, shall be entrusted with monitoring compliance with the conditionality attached to the financial assistance facility.”;

(f) the following paragraph is added:

“8. Subject to prior approval by the Board of Directors by mutual agreement, the ESM may enter into a memorandum of cooperation with the European Commission detailing the cooperation between the Managing Director and the European Commission in carrying out the tasks entrusted to them pursuant to paragraphs 1, 3 and 7 of this Article, and referred to in Article 3(1).”.

(22) Article 14 is replaced by the following:

“ARTICLE 14

ESM precautionary financial assistance

1. ESM precautionary financial assistance instruments provide support to ESM Members with sound economic fundamentals which could be affected by an adverse shock beyond their control. The Board of Governors may decide to grant precautionary financial assistance to an ESM Member whose government debt is sustainable in the form of a precautionary conditioned credit line or in the form of an enhanced conditions credit line in accordance with Article 12(1), subject to the fulfilment of eligibility criteria to be applied for each type of such assistance as provided for in Annex III.

The Board of Governors may decide to change the eligibility criteria for ESM precautionary financial assistance and amend Annex III accordingly. Such amendment shall enter into force after the ESM Members have notified the Depositary of the completion of their applicable national procedures.

2. The conditionality attached to a precautionary conditioned credit line shall consist of continuous respect of the eligibility criteria provided for in Annex III to which the ESM Member concerned shall commit in its signed request pursuant to Article 13(1) highlighting its main policy intentions (‘Letter of Intent’). On receipt of such a Letter of Intent, the Chairperson of the Board of Governors shall entrust the European Commission with the task of assessing whether the policy intentions included in the Letter of Intent are fully consistent with the measures of economic policy coordination provided for in the TFEU, in particular with any act of European Union law, including any opinion, warning, recommendation or decision addressed to the ESM Member concerned. By way of derogation from Article 13(3) and (4), no MoU shall be negotiated.

3. The conditionality attached to an enhanced conditions credit line shall be detailed in the MoU, in accordance with Article 13(3), and be coherent with the eligibility criteria provided for in Annex III.

4. The financial terms and conditions of the ESM precautionary financial assistance shall be specified in a precautionary financial assistance facility agreement, to be signed by the Managing Director.

5. The Board of Directors shall adopt the detailed guidelines on the modalities for implementing the ESM precautionary financial assistance.

6. The Board of Directors shall regularly consider, at least every six months or after the ESM Member has drawn funds for the first time (via a loan or a primary market purchase), a report in accordance with Article 13(7). For a precautionary conditioned credit line, the report shall verify continuous respect of the eligibility criteria as referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, whereas for an enhanced conditions credit line the report shall verify compliance with the policy conditions detailed in the MoU. Where the report concludes that the ESM Member continues to respect the eligibility criteria for the precautionary conditioned credit line or comply with the conditionality attached to the enhanced conditions credit line, the credit line shall be maintained unless the Managing Director or any Director requests a decision of the Board of Directors by mutual agreement whether the credit line should be maintained.

7. If the report pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Article concludes that the ESM Member no longer respects the eligibility criteria for the precautionary conditioned credit line or comply with the conditionality attached to the enhanced conditions credit line, access to the credit line shall be discontinued, unless the Board of Directors decides by mutual agreement to maintain the credit line. If the ESM Member has drawn funds before, an additional margin shall apply in line with the pricing guideline to be adopted by the Board of Governors pursuant to Article 20(2), unless the Board of Directors assesses on the basis of the report that non-compliance is due to events beyond the control of the ESM Member. If the credit line is not maintained, another form of financial assistance may be requested and granted in accordance with the applicable rules under this Treaty.”.

(23) In Article 15, paragraph 5 is replaced by the following:

“5. Where applicable, the Board of Directors shall decide by mutual agreement, on a proposal from the Managing Director and after having received a report from the Managing Director and the European Commission in accordance with Article 13(7), the disbursement of the tranches of the financial assistance subsequent to the first tranche.”.

(24) In Article 16, paragraph 5 is replaced by the following:

“5. The Board of Directors shall decide by mutual agreement, on a proposal from the Managing Director and after having received a report from the Managing Director and the European Commission in accordance with Article 13(7), the disbursement of the tranches of the financial assistance subsequent to the first tranche.”.

(25) In Article 17, paragraph 5 is replaced by the following:

“5. The Board of Directors shall decide by mutual agreement, on a proposal from the Managing Director and after having received a report from the Managing Director and the European Commission in accordance with Article 13(7), the disbursement of financial assistance to a beneficiary Member State through operations on the primary market.”.

(26) The following article is inserted:

“ARTICLE 18a

Backstop facility

1. On the basis of a request for a backstop facility by the SRB and of a proposal by the Managing Director, the Board of Governors may decide to grant a backstop facility to the SRB covering all possible uses of the SRF as enshrined in European Union law, subject to adequate safeguards.

The criteria for the approval of loans and disbursements under the backstop facility are provided for in Annex IV. The Board of Governors may decide to change the criteria for the approval of loans and disbursements and amend Annex IV accordingly. Such amendment shall enter into force after the ESM Members have notified the Depositary of the completion of their applicable national procedures.

The Board of Governors shall determine the key financial terms and conditions of the backstop facility, the nominal cap and any adjustments to it, provisions on the procedure for the verification of compliance with the condition of permanence of the legal framework for bank resolution and on the consequences for the backstop facility and its use as well as the conditions upon which the Board of Governors may decide to terminate the backstop facility and the conditions and time limits upon which the Board of Governors may decide to continue the backstop facility pursuant to paragraph 8.

2. The backstop facility shall take the form of a revolving credit line under which loans can be provided.

3. The detailed financial terms and conditions of the backstop facility shall be specified in a backstop facility agreement with the SRB, to be approved by the Board of Directors by mutual agreement and signed by the Managing Director.

4. The Board of Directors shall adopt and regularly review the detailed guidelines on the modalities for implementing the backstop facility, including on procedures ensuring swift adoption of decisions pursuant to paragraph 5.

5. On the basis of a request for a loan by the SRB, containing all relevant information while respecting confidentiality requirements of European Union law, a proposal from the Managing Director and an assessment of the SRB’s repayment capacity and, where relevant, the assessments by the European Commission and the ECB pursuant to paragraph 6, the Board of Directors shall decide by mutual agreement, guided by the criteria provided for in Annex IV, on loans and respective disbursements under the backstop facility. The Board of Directors may decide by mutual agreement to delegate to the Managing Director the task provided for in this paragraph for a specified period of time and amount, in line with the rules specified in guidelines adopted by the Board of Directors.

6. By way of derogation from Article 4(3), an emergency voting procedure shall be used where the European Commission and the ECB conclude in separate assessments that a failure to urgently adopt a decision by the Board of Directors on loans and respective disbursements under the backstop facility pursuant to the first sentence of paragraph 5 of this Article would threaten the economic and financial sustainability of the euro area. The adoption of such a decision by mutual agreement under that emergency procedure requires a qualified majority of 85% of the votes cast. This paragraph does not apply if, and for as long as, any procedures are ongoing concerning the permanence of the legal framework for bank resolution pursuant to paragraph 8 of this Article and related provisions adopted by the Board of Governors.

Where the emergency procedure referred to in the first subparagraph is used, a transfer to an emergency reserve fund is made in order to constitute a dedicated buffer to cover the risks arising from the loans and respective disbursements approved under that emergency procedure. The Board of Directors may decide by mutual agreement to cancel the emergency reserve fund and transfer its content back to the reserve fund and/or paid-in capital.

After two instances of the use of this emergency voting procedure, the application of the first subparagraph shall be suspended until the Board of Governors decides to cancel such suspension. The Board of Governors, when deciding to cancel such suspension, shall review the voting majority required for an adoption of a decision under said procedure and set the circumstances in which a review is to take place in the future, and may decide to amend this paragraph accordingly, without lowering the voting threshold. Such amendment shall enter into force after the ESM Members have notified the Depositary of the completion of their applicable national procedures.

7. The ESM shall establish an appropriate warning system to ensure timely receipt of repayments due under the backstop facility.

8. The backstop facility and its use under this Article shall be contingent upon compliance with the condition of permanence of the legal framework for bank resolution. Where the condition of the permanence of the legal framework for bank resolution is not complied with, a comprehensive review will be initiated and a decision by the Board of Governors shall be required to continue the backstop facility. Further provisions on the procedure for the verification of compliance with the condition of permanence of the legal framework for bank resolution and on the consequences for the backstop facility and its use, shall be determined by the Board of Governors pursuant to paragraph 1.

9. For the purpose of paragraph 8 of this Article, the permanence of the legal framework for bank resolution shall consist of:

(a) the permanence, as defined in Article 9(1) of the Intergovernmental Agreement of 21 May 2014 on the transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund (‘IGA’), of the rules defined in Article 9(1) IGA; and

(b) the permanence of the principles and rules relating to the bail-in tool and to the framework on the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities laid down in BRRD, SRMR and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012¹⁰ , to the extent that these principles and rules are relevant for preserving the financial means of the SRF.

10. In implementing this Article, the ESM shall cooperate closely with Participating Member States participating alongside the ESM in backstop financing for the SRF.”.

(27) In Article 19, the title is replaced by the following:

“Review of and amendments to the list of financial assistance instruments”.

(28) In Article 20, paragraphs 1 and 2 are replaced by the following:

“1. When granting stability support or backstop financing for the SRF, the ESM shall aim to fully cover its financing and operating costs and shall include an appropriate margin.

2. For all financial assistance instruments and backstop financing for the SRF, pricing shall be detailed in a pricing guideline, which shall be adopted by the Board of Governors.”.

(29) In Article 21, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

“1. The ESM shall be empowered to borrow on the capital markets from banks, financial institutions or other persons or institutions for the performance of its purposes.”.

(30) In Article 30, paragraph 5 is replaced by the following:

“5. The Board of Governors shall make the annual report accessible to the national parliaments and supreme audit institutions of the ESM Members, to the European Court of Auditors and to the European Parliament.”.

(31) In Article 37, the following paragraph is added:

“4. Any dispute between ESM Members concerning the compliance with the condition of the permanence of the legal framework for bank resolution laid down in Article 18a may be directly submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union in line with the procedure to be determined by the Board of Governors pursuant to Article 18a(1) and (8). The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union shall be binding on the parties to the procedure; the ESM shall act in conformity with such judgment.”.

(32) In Article 38 the sole paragraph is replaced by the following:

“The ESM shall be entitled, for the furtherance of its purposes, to cooperate, within the terms of this Treaty, with the IMF, any State which provides financial assistance to an ESM Member on an ad hoc basis, any Member State of the European Union and any international organisation or entity having responsibilities in related fields.”.

(33) In Article 40, the following paragraph is added:

“4. Without prejudice to Articles 8 to 11 and 39, the Board of Governors may, in order to facilitate the transfer referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, create an additional tranche of authorised capital, to be subscribed by some or all EFSF shareholders in proportion to the contribution key set out in Annex 2 to the EFSF Framework Agreement signed on 10 June 2010 (as amended). The additional tranche shall consist of callable capital, shall have no voting rights (even if such capital is called), and shall be subject to a maximum amount corresponding to the aggregate principal amount outstanding of the EFSF loan facilities transferred multiplied by a percentage no higher than 165%. The Board of Governors shall determine the manner and circumstances of capital calls and payments under the additional tranche.

The transfer referred to in paragraph 2 shall not increase the sum of EFSF and ESM liabilities compared to a scenario where that transfer does not take place. The additional tranche shall support the transfer of the EFSF loans and shall be reduced in line with the repayment of said loans.

The decision by the Board of Governors under the first subparagraph shall enter into force after ESM Members have notified the Depositary of the completion of their applicable national procedures.”.

(34) In Article 45, points 1 and 2 are replaced by the following:

“1) Annex I: Contribution key of the ESM;

2) Annex II: Subscriptions to the authorised capital stock;

3) Annex III: Eligibility criteria for ESM precautionary financial assistance; and

4) Annex IV: Criteria for the approval of loans and disbursements under the backstop facility.”.

(35) The following text is added as Annex III:

“ANNEX III

Eligibility criteria for ESM precautionary financial assistance

1. The criteria below represent the eligibility criteria for ESM precautionary financial assistance and have been determined having regard to:

(a) the Euro Summit Statement of 14 December 2018 which endorsed the term sheet on the reform of the ESM, specifying that ex ante eligibility criteria assessing sound economic and financial performance will be clarified, and that the enhanced conditions credit line (‘ECCL’) instrument will continue to be available as foreseen in the current ESM guideline; and

(b) the joint position on future cooperation between the European Commission and the ESM, as annexed to the term sheet on the reform of the ESM, as well as to the roles and competences of institutions as foreseen in the European Union legal framework.

Furthermore considering that the procedure for granting ESM precautionary financial assistance follows Articles 13 and 14 of this Treaty, and that according to Article 14(1) of this Treaty, the Board of Governors may decide to grant precautionary financial assistance to an ESM Member whose government debt is sustainable, and that the Board of Directors shall adopt the detailed guidelines on the modalities for implementing ESM precautionary financial assistance accordance with Article 14(5) of this Treaty.

2. Eligibility criteria for granting a precautionary conditioned credit line (‘PCCL’):

Access to a PCCL shall be based on eligibility criteria and limited to ESM Members where the economic and financial situation is fundamentally strong and whose government debt is sustainable. As a rule, ESM Members need to meet quantitative benchmarks and comply with qualitative conditions related to EU surveillance. An assessment shall be made on whether a potential beneficiary ESM Member qualifies for a PCCL on the basis of the following criteria:

(a) respect of the quantitative fiscal benchmarks. The ESM Member shall not be under excessive deficit procedure and needs to meet the three following benchmarks in the two years preceding the request for precautionary financial assistance:

(i) a general government deficit not exceeding 3% of GDP;

(ii) a general government structural budget balance at or above the country specific minimum benchmark^* ;

(iii) a debt benchmark consisting of a general government debt to GDP ratio below 60% or a reduction in the differential with respect to 60% over the previous two years at an average rate of one twentieth per year;

(b) absence of excessive imbalances. The ESM Member should not be identified as experiencing excessive imbalances under EU surveillance;

(c) a track record of access to international capital markets, where relevant, on reasonable terms;

(d) a sustainable external position; and

(e) absence of severe financial sector vulnerabilities putting at risk the ESM Member’s financial stability.

3. Eligibility criteria for granting an ECCL

Access to an ECCL shall be open to ESM Members that are not eligible to the PCCL because of non-compliance with some eligibility criteria but whose general economic and financial situation remains strong and whose government debt is sustainable.”.

(36) The following text is added as Annex IV:

“ANNEX IV

Criteria for the approval of loans and disbursements under the backstop facility

1. The criteria below represent the criteria for the approval of loans and disbursements under the backstop facility and have been determined having regard to:

(a) The terms of reference of the common backstop to the SRF endorsed at the Euro Summit of 14 December 2018;

(b) Recital 15b of this Treaty recalling that terms of reference of the common backstop to the SRF endorsed at the Euro Summit of 14 December 2018 foresee criteria for disbursements under the backstop facility including inter alia the principles of last resort and fiscal neutrality over the medium term, full compliance with SRMR and with BRRD, and permanence of the legal framework;

(c) Article 12(1a) of this Treaty specifying that loans under the backstop facility shall only be granted as a last resort and to the extent that it is fiscally neutral in the medium term;

(d) Article 18a(8) of this Treaty specifying that the backstop facility and its use shall be contingent upon compliance with the condition of permanence of the legal framework for bank resolution and that further provisions on the procedure on the verification of compliance with this condition and on the consequences for the backstop facility and its use shall be determined by the Board of Governors pursuant to Article 18a(1) of this Treaty;

(e) Article 18a(5) of this Treaty specifying that the Board of Directors shall decide by mutual agreement, guided by the criteria provided for in this Annex, on loans and respective disbursements under the backstop facility,

and considering that the procedure for granting and implementing the backstop facility follows Article 18a of this Treaty and that the Board of Directors shall adopt detailed guidelines on the modalities for implementing the backstop facility in accordance with Article 18a(4) of this Treaty.

2. Criteria for the approval of loans and disbursements under the backstop facility:

(a) Recourse to the backstop facility is of last resort. Therefore:

(i) the financial means of the SRF available to be used in accordance with Article 76 of the SRMR that are not already committed to resolution actions are depleted, including the situation where there are financial means available in the SRF, but those are insufficient for the resolution case at hand;

(ii) ex post contributions are not sufficient or not immediately available; and

(iii) the SRB is not able to borrow on terms and conditions considered acceptable by the SRB in accordance with Articles 73 and 74 of the SRMR;

(b) The principle of fiscal neutrality over the medium term is respected. The repayment capacity of the SRB is sufficient to fully repay the loans granted under the backstop facility over the medium term;

(c) The requested funds are available to the ESM. In the case of cash disbursements, the ESM has obtained the funds on terms acceptable to the ESM or, in the case of non-cash disbursements, the notes are legally created and held in custody of the applicable security depository;

(d) All the parties to the IGA, in the territories of which the relevant resolution action takes place, have complied with their obligations to transfer contributions received from the institutions authorised in their territory to the SRF;

(e) There is no ongoing event of default on borrowings of the SRB from the ESM or from any other creditor, or the SRB has presented a remedy plan in respect of any such ongoing event of default which is satisfactory to the Board of Directors;

(f) The condition of permanence of the legal framework on bank resolution as defined in Article 18a(9) of this Treaty is complied with, as determined by the Board of Governors pursuant to Article 18a(1) and (8) of this Treaty; and

(g) The dedicated resolution scheme is fully compliant with European Union law and has entered into force in accordance with European Union law.”.

ARTICLE 2

Deposit

This Amending Agreement shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (“the Depositary”), which shall communicate certified copies to all the Signatories.

ARTICLE 3

Consolidation

The Depositary shall establish a consolidated version of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism and communicate it to all the Signatories.

ARTICLE 4

Ratification, approval or acceptance

1. This Amending Agreement shall be subject to ratification, approval or acceptance by the Signatories. Instruments of ratification, approval, or acceptance shall be deposited with the Depositary.

2. The Depositary shall notify the other Signatories of each deposit and the date thereof.

ARTICLE 5

Entry into force and accession

1. This Amending Agreement shall enter into force on the date when instruments of ratification, approval or acceptance have been deposited by all the Signatories.

2. Before its entry into force, this Amending Agreement shall be open for accession by Member States of the European Union acceding to the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism in accordance with Articles 2 and 44 thereof.

Articles 2 and 44 of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism shall also apply to the accession to this Amending Agreement.

The acceding Member State shall be required to submit the application for accession to this Amending Agreement simultaneously with the application for accession to the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism. The approval of the application by the Board of Governors under Article 44 of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism shall take effect upon simultaneous deposit of the instruments of accession to both the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism and this Amending Agreement.

Done in a single original, whose Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Portuguese, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish texts are equally authentic.

¹ IO L 225, 30.7.2014, lch. 1.

² IO L 287, 29.10.2013, lch. 63.

³ IO L 225, 30.7.2014, lch. 1.

⁴ IO L 173, 12.6.2014, lch. 190.

⁵ IO L 176, 27.6.2013, lch. 1.

^* Is é atá san íos-tagarmharc ná, leibhéal na cothromaíochta struchtúraí a thugann lamháil sábháilteachta i leith thairseach sin 3% CFAE faoi ghnáth-dhálaí timthriallacha. Úsáidtear é, den chuid is mó, mar cheann de thrí ionchur i ríomh íosmhéid an chuspóra mheántéarmaigh.

⁶ OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1.

⁷ OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63.

⁸ J L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1.

⁹ OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190.

¹⁰ OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1.

^* The minimum benchmark is the level of the structural balance providing a safety margin against the 3% TFEU threshold under normal cyclical conditions. It is mainly used as one of three inputs into the calculation of the minimum medium-term objective.